CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND URBAN PLANNING:

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS

SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL

By

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ABSTRACT

After outlining the history and development of
participation in urban planning, the functions
of participation as a government organized ac-
tivity and the role of participation in the tra-
ditional planning process are analyzed.

The demand by citizens for greater participation
arose primarily due to the massive amounts of
redevelopment of urban land after WW II--rede-
velopment which is negatively affecting large
numbers of urban residents.

Because of fiscal constraints on government spend-
ing, coupled with a rise in social turmoil during
the 1960's and the increasing citizen opposition
to many planning proposals, government officials
are increasingly turning to well managed partici-
pation programs as a means of regulating and con-
troling social discontent. Participation is also
a method of gathering information about the strengths
and weaknesses of potential citizen opposition in
order to incorporate this data into the planning
process.

Although participation is, in theory, a democratic
and progressive activity, it can easily be used to
manipulate and co-opt legitimate citizen concern
about various planning proposals. For this rea-
son it is necessary for citizens and planners alike
to understand the pragmatic reality of the role
and functions of participation, as opposed to the
liberal rhetoric surrounding it today.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical
analysis of the functions and social significance
of participation which will enable planners and
citizens to better understand the realities of
current participation activities in order to better
decide what forms of intervention are most fruit-
ful in utilizing participation for progressive
social change.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Citizen participation is the focus of a great deal of debate in urban planning. Arguments on the costs and benefits of involving citizens in the planning process, and questions on the most effective methods of organizing and managing citizen participation programs, are continually debated by planners and government officials.

In the early decades of this century, planners actively sought greater public participation in planning issues. During the 1960's it was the reverse: citizens began demanding more participation while officials tended to resist it. Today we see both happening at the same time: citizens continue to demand an ever greater role in urban planning decisions, while government sometimes develops sophisticated and highly structured public participation programs, and at other times refuses to allow citizens to participate at all.

If we turn to the existing body of literature on participation we find very few satisfactory explanations for all this. Almost all the literature is descriptive. It consists primarily of case studies, arguments for or against incorporating various levels of participation into the planning process, the techniques of organizing participation programs, the problems, benefits,

dilemmas of participation, and the like. These various aspects of participation are treated in isolation from each other and any comprehensive framework for analyzing the "participation phenomenon" as a whole is lacking.

Rather than further contribute to the current disjointed debate over citizen participation, this paper attempts to develop a systematic analysis of citizen participation, that is, a theoretical framework in which to better organize our observations about participation and to better understand and analyze the social significance of the participation activities going on today. The purpose of such a theoritical framework is to help clarify and give guidance to the position planners and citizens committed to genuinely democratic social change should take with regard to citizen participation in urban planning.

In developing a more comprehensive analysis of the social significance of participation, this paper analyses past (Chapter II), present (Chapter III and IV), and future (Chapter V) purposes and functions of participation.

First, Chapter II provides historical background for the rest of the paper by outlining the history and development of participation in planning: the reasons why planners sought public support and involvement in the early years of the planning profession; the functions of participation in the urban renewal programs of the 1950's and early 1960's; why "maximum feasible participation" was included in the War on Poverty programs in the U.S. and the impact this has had; and finally, the response

of the planning profession to the social turmoil and the problems of implementation of the 1960's.

Chapters III and IV then analyse the functions of today's participation activities. Chapter III analyses the social and economic forces which are behind the many highly structured government-sponsored participation programs. In order to deal with this properly, this chapter will outline the functions of the state, the functions of state intervention and the fiscal constraints facing government activity. In Chapter IV the traditional planning process and the reasons behind the incorporation of well managed participation into it are analysed.

Finally, Chapter V considers the likely outcomes participation in urban planning will produce in the near future if current trends continue, and suggests alternative courses of action for citizens and planners.

CHAPTER II

PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING: ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Birth of the Planning Profession

City planning, as a distinct professional activity, is
not very old. Both the Town Planning Institute of Canada (TPIC)
and the American City Planning Institute (ACPI) were not es-
tablished until 1917.[1] Previous to this, and for some time
thereafter, architects, engineers and land surveyors performed
many of the activities which today belong to professional
planners.

In these early years planning was defined by the pro-
fession as

the scientific and orderly disposition of land
and buildings in use and development with a view
to obviating congestion and securing economic and
social efficiency, health and well-being in urban
and regional communities.[2]

Planning arose in response to the rapid and disorderly growth
of cities caused by the industrial revolution and was closely
allied with the social reform movements of the early twentieth
century. "Scientific" planning was proposed as a means of
curing many of the city's ills.

Social problems and labour unrest were constantly increasing due to the many problems rapid and totally uncontrolled urban growth had caused. In 1921 the president of the TPIC described some of these conditions in the following way:

> we have the crowded cities, the growing slums,
> the separation of home and place of employment,
> the depopulated country, the development of class
> segregation with extreme riches on the one hand
> and extreme poverty on the other, and the growth
> of unrest.[3]

He pointed out that the day is past when "the deadly doctrine of laissez faire" can be allowed to control and direct national priorities. "With due regard to the sanctity of contracts," he continued, "we must place life on a higher plane than property."[4]

The planning movement did not simply grow out of a social and moral concern for the conditions of the poor: to a large extent the institutionalization of planning became a political necessity. Around the turn of the century, populist, labour, and socialist movements posed potentially serious threats to capitalism, both in Canada and in the United States. It was clear to many corporate leaders that some form of rationalization of urban and rural development was necessary if order was to be maintained.

Early planning literature is full of articles containing the following sort of explanation of the real value for "scientific" town planning. Here are two typical examples from

a planning journal:

> congested living conditions have created a mass
> of social discontent which is seriously threatening
> the stability of nations.
> 'Reform delayed,' said Edmund Burke, 'is
> revolution begun.'
> Where working people have comfortable homes,
> gardens, and recreation space for outdoor life
> there is no social discontent, no labour turnover,
> no revolutionary societies. . . . 'Bolshevism,'
> said the Governor General of Canada, 'hides in the
> slums of our towns and cities.' [5]

> We must impress upon the employer that the
> well being and stamina of his hire, the healthy
> conservation of the human element are a greater
> asset to him in winning the industrial battle
> than even the installation of modern machinery,
> that evil living conditions go hand in hand with
> discontent and resentment, and that a steady and
> reliable labour market is a clear and constant gain. [6]

Planning as a professional activity arose and rapidly grew
during the period of the Russian revolution, the Winnipeg
general strike, the formation of the militant One Big Union
(OBU) in Canada and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)
in the U.S., and other similar radical movements. One result
was that by 1925 many of Canada's provinces had some planning
legislation, and in the U.S. a number of local city planning
and zoning commissions had been established. [7]

2. The Problem of Recognition

Even with this initial bit of legislation, the primary
difficulty faced by early planners was the almost total lack
of substantive official (legal and legislative) powers needed

for the implementation of planning reforms. Planners had to
convince politicians of the necessity for and benefits of their
rational scientific planning and the development controls it
would bring.

One way to do this, they decided, was to get the help
of the public.

> In fact the root and branch of the whole thing
> seems to be a matter of public education. . . .
> Indeed particular emphasis might be laid on the
> word 'public' for until we have the great masses
> behind us town planning will never amount to
> very much.
>
> What we need most is to open the eyes of our
> legislative and administrative authorities--federal,
> provincial and municipal, and the only thing that
> will do this will be the pressure of public
> opinion.[8]

The participation of citizens, in the form of seeking their
support for planning concepts, was thus sought from the early
part of this century. This type of public involvement re-
mained an aspect of planning as long as official recognition
of planning remained a problem.

Recognition was an especially difficult problem in the
United States, where the power of local levels of government
was very large compared to the state and federal levels. In
Canada, as in Great Britain, the national and provincial levels
of government had much greater power than the local levels.
Thomas Adams, President of the Town Planning Institute of
Canada, noted that:

> In Canada there is no constitutional difficulty
> in doing so [gaining legal recognition for planning].
> Our provinces can pass legislation similar to that
> of the British Parliament, and they have the power
> to enforce its application in the same way. . . .
> In the United States, however, there appear to be
> peculiar difficulties in securing legislation of
> such a democratic kind as the British Town Planning
> Act.9

Where power was centralized it was easier to pass planning and

zoning legislation which would then force the local levels

to comply.

Thus, in Canada and Great Britain, planning became

more of an accepted institution with legal authority and power

rather early in the game. Planners and civic proponents of

planning primarily relied upon government for its legitimation,

rather than continually attempting to persuade citizens through

public education and public relations campaigns. In fact, as

late as 1965, an official of Canada's Central Mortgage and

Housing Corporation noted the lack of public involvement in

planning:

> I have always been impressed with the city-wide
> and local citizen organizations which flourish in
> the United States and which have few parallels in
> Canada.

> At the local level . . . we have nothing to
> compare with the great citizens' organizations of
> Philiadelphia, Pittsburgh and New Haven. Some
> efforts have been made to organize such groups, but
> they have proved abortive. . . .

> At the project level, too, there is nothing
> comparable with the block organizations of Baltimore,

or the neighborhood renewal groups in New Haven, Boston, and many other cities. . . . There is not in Canada any ongoing organization of people directly affected by any renewal program.[10]

In the U.S., on the other hand, individual local units of government each had to be convinced of the need for planning legislation and of specific planning proposals.

> The effectiveness of city planning depends upon the ability of city planners to sell or convince the public and administrative and operating bodies of their plans and objectives, since by law planning is advisory and recommendatory. This calls for the upmost harmony in public relations.[11] (my emphasis)

Thus, planning, especially in the United States, has had a long history of seeking support from the public, although these attempts have not always been successful. Citizen planning commissions were established in many localities as far back as the 1910's and 1920's. These planning commissions were composed of businessmen, realtors, lawyers, architects and other professionals who would recommend future development policies and, through various meetings, attempt to build public support to help convince the local city council to implement planning reforms. In 1953, Herbert Gans pointed out that planning in the United States,

> generally goes on the assumption that given the proper public relations, the people for whom the planning is being done should support the program, and exert their political power to see that it is adopted. Since this does not happen often, planners talk about 'citizen apathy' as the main cause of planning's political problems, and get up at conventions to urge more participation.[12]

He defined participation as an "informed interest in politi-
cal events on the part of the rank and file citizen" which
would develop into political activity to support a planning
proposal when necessary.[13]   Another planner, in describing the
Philadelphia Citizens Council, points out that the "continuing
and intensive" involvement of citizens in planning "has pro-
duced concerted citizen support for planning in Philadelphia--
support which has permitted the City Council to approve the
passage of every major planning proposal brought before it
during the past seventeen years."[14]

This first phase in the development of participation
in urban planning can be characterized as being a fairly low
keyed attempt to 'sell' planning through public education.
Citizen participation was something planning officials sought
and could not get enough of. Participation of the public in
planning was not the hotly debated, controversial issue it
has become today.

In fact, planners also went so far as to advocate the
use of community organizers as a means of involving more citizens.
It was believed that if communities were better organized,
neighbourhood associations would not only support planning
efforts, but would also help check the decline and deterioration
of urban residential areas by residents encouraging one another
to maintain their property in good repair.[15]

In some cities in the U.S., community organizers were
even hired to help establish neighbourhood organizations.

A 1958 article on citizen participation in the <u>Journal of the</u>
<u>American Institute of Planners</u> made recommendations which were
not all that controversial for the day, but today similar
ideas are often comdemned by officials as impractical and
radical.

The authors argued that "the neighborhood planning pro-
cess can be a joint enterprise <u>only</u> if the community is taken
into the effort from the beginning" and they urged that the
best way to do this was for the planning agency to hire community
organizers. The article then goes on for another seven pages
detailing how the organizers and planners would function in
different planning situations.[16] In early 1973, two Toronto
City Council members proposed that the City hire community
organizers to perform similar fuctions. Their proposal was
condemned, not only by the conservative establishment but also
by many of their liberal friends.[17]

3. From Urban Expansion to Urban Redevelopment

The change in the official attitude towards participation
came during the 1950's and 1960's. It was during this period
that planning proposals (such as urban expressways, urban
renewal schemes, and public housing location) were increasingly
being opposed by citizens, something which only rarely occurred
previously. Planning had become fairly well institutionalized
in Canada and the United States by the 1950's so the lack of
official support for implementation of planning was less of a

problem. The problem now became one of <u>public opposition</u> to implementation of planning proposals, a problem which has continued to this day.

The primary reason for this rapid growth in the rate of fairly well organized public opposition to planning proposals is that somewhat after WW II, <u>the era of unchecked urban expansion was increasingly replaced by an era of urban redevelopment</u>. With <u>re</u>development of land already in use, comes all sorts of conflicts which never arose during the period of expansion. Urban expansion into underdeveloped fringe land did not cause turmoil because 1) it did not directly affect people in a negative way (by tearing down their homes and neighbourhoods, or tearing down historic buildings, or placing an expressway in the local park, and the like), and 2) urban expansion could always be easily justified by claiming that it benefits everyone in the area by providing more jobs and a better tax base. The opposite occurs with redevelopment--someone benefits and someone gets hurt directly.

4. Urban Renewal Conflicts

By the 1950's the flight from the cities to the suburbs was advancing at a rapid pace leaving behind increasing deterioration in the downtown and inner-city residential neighbourhoods of American cities. It was no longer considered profitable for private interests to invest in sizable new development schemes without massive government subsidies. However, local business

interests realized that something had to be done to protect their existing investments.

In 1949 the first urban renewal legislation was passed by the U.S. Congress. Its primary device for redevelopment was "the clearance of slums and blighted areas",[18] and the means to achieve this was the power of eminent domain--the legal right of the state to take property by force. The problem raised by this is who decides to take whose property for which purposes. Given the nature of the state in capitalist society and the composition of local planning commissions, there was never any question who would be benefiting and who would be losing in the urban renewal game.

Since the 1920's the influential and powerful members of the local power structures learned to make use of the new "science" of planning to promote their common interests under the banner of the the"public interest." Studies of American planning commissions during the 1940's and 1950's show that a majority of their members were businessmen, with a consistent representation of realtors or others whose business was the development of land. As one political scientist pointed out, there was a

> noticeable absence of planning commission members
> drawn from labor, from minority groups, from the
> welfare professions, and from housewives. The
> homogeneous character of planning commissions
> raises a question about how well such boards
> are able to 'represent' even in a general way the
> various economic and social groups in communities. . .[19]

Since planning commissions, as well as most local levels
of government, were controlled by business and real estate
interests, planning proposals were increasingly being opposed
by citizens when these interests, with the power of eminent
domain at their disposal, became too greedy. Martin Anderson,
a conservative economist and an early critic of urban renewal,
made this point quite clear:

> Again and again--from bankers, politicians,
> newspaper editors, businessmen, and even religious
> leaders--I heard statements like these:
>
> 'Well, I've tried to buy property in that area of
> town, but the owner won't sell at a reasonable
> price. Somebody has to make him sell at a 'fair'
> price. Who does he think he is, standing in the way
> of the whole city?' Or, 'We need at least a whole
> block to do anything worthwhile; we can't fool
> around trying to buy a lot here and a lot there.
> Besides, some old man may feel attached to pro-
> perty that's been in his family for years. We
> can't wait for him to die. We need the tool of
> eminent domain.'
>
> In essence these 'community leaders' are
> saying that they have no compunction whatso-
> ever about invoking the police power of the
> state to accomplish by force what they cannot
> accomplish by persuasion. If they can't persuade
> an old man to sell his property, then they will
> make him sell, and use the strong arm of a
> healthy policeman to back up their demand. [20]

The cleared urban renewal land was sold by the local gov-
ernment to private developers for about 30% of the city's cost
of acquiring, clearing, and improving it. Two thirds of the
city's loss was made up by the federal government. Although
most of the money and guidance came from Washington, the actual
planning and execution of projects was left up to local officials

and planners. In most cases low income, inner city neighbour-
hoods were destroyed to make room for commercial developments,
high-income apartments, civic centers, sports stadiums, and
parking lots for suburban commuters and shoppers. All this
was done in the name of the public interest. As Anderson points
out, "The issue that users of euphemistic phrases like the public
interest evade, consciously or unconsciously, is the sacrifice
on one man's interests to another's!"[21] It is, therefore, no
wonder that as the amount of redevelopment taking place in-
creased so did the amount of citizen opposition increase. In
addition, public participation in redevelopment was not desired
(for obvious reasons), whereas participation in rehabilitation
projects in the form of "self help" was still encouraged.

5. Participation in Urban Renewal

The first urban renewal legislation in the U.S. (1949)
was concerned solely with the redevelopment of land--the ac-
quisition, clearance and disposal of land for redevelopment
purposes. A 1954 amendment included a new emphasis on renewal,
the restoration of blighted or deteriorating areas by "carrying
out plans for a program of voluntary repair and rehabilitation
of buildings or other improvements in accordance with the
urban renewal plan."[22] Rehabilitation was now encouraged be-
cause a study had found that the cost of demolishing and rebuilding
America's slums was well beyond computation and comprehension.

The 1954 urban renewal amendment also included "citizen participation" in renewal projects as one of seven elements qualifying an area for federal aid. This was the first time participation was ever officially required, although it was never precisly defined. The cooperation of home owners was required if rehabilitation of blighted areas was to be successful. It was believed that through participation in community affairs individuals would be more inclined to make home improvements. Participation was thus seen as a self help method of slowing or preventing urban decay. Descriptive accounts of so called "successful" citizen participation point out the importance of things as creation of "neighbourhood problems committees," which concerned themselves "with poor housekeeping habits exhibited by some residents."[23]

The fact that planning officials believed that citizen participation is necessary in rehabilitation and conservation projects, but should not be invoked in clearance areas, was confirmed by a survey of planning officials.

> In each case, the utility value of citizens is their ability to assist in implementing urban renewal goals. For rehabilitation projects, this is clearly evident. The achievement of rehabilitation goals depends wholly upon the decisions and voluntary actions of property owners. Without residents' cooperation the project cannot be successful.[24]

Urban renewal directors agreed that citizens in clearance areas should not participate in the program. "In clearance areas," one explained, "you don't organize; you prepare people for

moving."[25] It was commonly feared (for good reason), that assisting citizens to organize may actually damage the local planning authorities renewal program.

As the urban renewal program expanded, the amount of opposition to specific projects also grew. By the early 1960's there was widespread controversy and opposition to the program. "One of the most dangerous threats to urban renewal," Anderson points out, "is widespread knowledge of its nature. . . . 'The only thing urban renewal can't stand is publicity.'"[26]

It was during the early 1960's that citizen participation also began to become controversial. For the first time the term "positive and constructive participation" was being used by officials and in planning literature, referring to participation which would influence some of the general goals of renewal and modify a few of its details, but would allow renewal to proceed more or less as planned.

Aside from the usually fruitless attempts to use participation as "self help," participation was also used to build community support for renewal. A 1959 survey of citizen participation in renewal found that the use of advisory committees was one of the most widespread devices used to permit "citizens" to participate. However, membership on these committees "concentrated heavily on representation from real estate, construction, and business groups, particularly chambers of commerce, as well as some community wide housing and planning groups, but representation from the project areas was almost totally absent."[26] It was

these groups of business men who defined what the local "public
interest" was, which they then vigorously promoted through the
media, civic meetings, and the like. The unorganized, the re-
sidents of project areas, small neighbourhood groups were not
involved in renewal planning and implementation.

With the opposition to urban renewal programs becoming
quite extensive throughout the U.S., some justification for the
program and some sort of means of explaining away the opposition
had to be developed. The analysis provided by James Q. Wilson
is a good example of a social scientist performing his function
quite well in providing a legitimizing rationale for an anti-social,
undemocratic government program.

In 1962, Wilson astutely observed that residents had
been increasingly resisting clearance and removal of their homes
and that the overall growth of community-wide resistence to
urban renewal has been gradual and cumulative.[28] Many of the
first renewal projects were completed with little organized
opposition. "Somehow," Wilson states, "people have learned
from the experience of others, and today, in cities which have
been engaged in renewal for several years, the planners often
find prospective renewal areas ready and waiting for them, or-
ganized to the teeth." In fact, he points to one project which
was "stopped dead in its tracks by organized neighborhood
opposition."[29]

One can draw one of two conclusions from this: There is
either something wrong with the renewal program, or there is

something wrong with the people who oppose it.

Wilson draws the latter conclusion, pointing out that those who were moved out of their neighbourhoods and whose homes and apartments were to be torn down were usually lower-income blacks. "Such people," he explains, "are likely to have what one might call a 'private-regarding' rather than a 'public-regarding' political ethos."[30] These sorts of people are un-likely to form organizations to define and carry out "long range, very general civic tasks" but they are likely to organize them-selves in response to threats. "Whereas it is relatively easy to obtain consent to renewal plans when people are thinking in terms of general plans and community-wide benefits," he adds, "it is much harder--often impossible--when people see the same set of facts in terms of possible threats and costs."[31]

Wilson admits that the view a neighbourhood is likely to take of urban renewal "is in great part a product of its class composition." He defines class as a state of mind, with "upper-middle class people" thinking in terms of the public good and the long term benefits, and "lower and lower-middle class people" thinking in terms of specific threats and short term costs. He draws these conclusions based on what had been happening in cities with urban renewal projects. He never points out, however, that urban renewal demolition and clearance projects never occur in upper class areas and therefore these people never have had to face specific threats in which they had no share in the decision making process.

He fails to point out that it is segments of this "upper and upper-middle class" which form the local power structures who in turn make all the important decisions, decisions which are made in the interests and to the benefits of their class. It has always been one of the functions of planning "professionals" such as Wilson to distort and confuse these class interests. The community must be convinced that upper class interests are indeed the public's interests. Thus, starting with the assumption that upper class interests are the public's interests, Wilson can and really must conclude that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the urban renewal program, but that something is wrong with the people who protest against it. But even Wilson's own description of renewal goals points out whose interests they really serve.

> Adjusting the goals of renewal to the demands of the lower classes means, among other things, substantially reducing the prospects for assembling sufficiently large tracts of cleared land to make feasible the construction of dwelling units attractive to the middle-class suburbanite whom the city is anxious to woo back into its taxing jurisdiction. This, in turn, means that the central city may have to abandon the goal of recolonizing itself with a tax-paying, culture-loving, free spending middle class. . . [32]

6. Maximum Feasible Participation and the War on Poverty

Although the 1954 Urban Renewal Act first legislated the requirement of public participation in planning, the level and quality of the mandated participation was very weak. The impact

of public participation on society and on the planning process
was therefore not very significant. Urban renewal did manage
to make planning, in general, a highly controversial issue,
especially when redevelopment proposals were involved. However,
it was not until 1964, when Lyndon Johnson launched his "War on
Poverty," requiring "maximum feasible participation of residents,"
that the idea of real participation had a profound and lasting
impact on society. From that point on, widespread participation
in government programs became and still remains a highly charged
issue involving power. The problem is no longer whether, or even
when, to allow citizens to participate, but rather, how.

The significance of the "War on Poverty" does not rest on
what it intended to accomplish, but on its unintended results
and ramifications. The primary component of the 1964 Economic
Opportunity Act, which launched the "War on Poverty," was the de-
velopment of Community Action Programs (CAP). The purposes of the
CAP's were: 1) to mobilize the community's public and private
resources in the attack on poverty; 2) to provide services,
assistance and other activities aimed at the elimination of poverty;
and 3) to develop and administer these CAP's with the maximum
feasible participation of residents of the area involved and
members of the groups served.

At the time the bill was drafted and processed through
Congress, inclusion of the requirement for maximum feasible par-
ticipation was not at all controversial and in fact, ended up in
the legislation almost by accident.[33] During the five months

between the publication and passage of the bill, no discussion of the participation clause took place. In the several thousand pages of Congressional testimony prior to passage, participation was mentioned only once, very briefly.[34]

Participation by the poor had been noncontroversial previous to the "War on Poverty" because most Americans have believed that the poor had only themselves to blame for their condition. It was their own shortcomings and lack of initiative, not any failure of the social order, which led them astray. If the poor were not so lazy, they could lift themselves out of poverty. Participation of the poor in anti-poverty programs was seen as one means of helping the poor to help themselves.

An example of this thinking, can be seen in the Ford Foundation's Gray Areas Project which aimed to bring slum residents into "the mainstream of American life." The philosophy behind the program was based on two articles of faith: effective community action needed participation of the groups involved, and indigenous leadership was necessary to provide communication between the planners and the community. Another similar forerunner of the "War on Poverty" was the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, formed in 1961, which laid great stress of the "necessity for upgrading the capabilities of the inarticulate and disadvantaged to become more articulate and more capable of participating effectively in the setting of goals and implementing those goals in the life of the community."[35]

The intent of these two programs, as well as the entire "War on Poverty" effort, was to change the poor, not the structural causes of their poverty.[36] The poverty program, therefore, produced outcomes which would logically be anticipated to follow from the theories which underly the program. The outcomes, however, were not necessarily those hoped for.

Within months after the initiation of local CAP's, the program was greeted with outrage and branded a "blueprint for revolution." Local political authorities claimed the federal government was financing an attack on city halls, and undermining the local status quo. Heated controversy quickly arose in most communities over "how many" poor should be involved. Should the representatives of the poor necessarily be poor themselves? In what way should they participate? Long, bitter, endless struggles took place in many communities. The fear raised by the program was due to the fact that participation, essentially designed to stimulate manageable and "safe" forms of community organizations, led to unacceptable and threatening forms which went well beyond the original intent of the anti-poverty legislation.

With the help of federal poverty money and some activists from such groups as SNCC, SDS, the Northern Student Movement and the civil rights movement, the poor were for the first time ever, well enough organized to demand and fight for their rights. The participation issue had become so heated, the political implications so profound, that no one any longer talked about the worthy or deserving poor and there was no longer any suggestion that

the poor were incapable of managing their destiny. For the
first time, participation was interpreted as power and influence
over decision making, not just advising about or supporting
of projects and programs.

What had gone wrong? Daniel Moynihan states: "This is
the essential fact: The government did not know what it was
doing." (his emphasis)[37] He attributes the problems to the
fact that the ideas of "those liberal, policy-orientated in-
tellectuals who gathered in Washington" were foolish, as were
the politicians who were "taken in" by them. Morris and Rien[38]
have a similar view. They trace the programs to a blossoming
of reform idealism, which upon implementation, foundered on the
resistance of the local politicians and bureaucrats. It is true
that the federal government had no idea of the ultimate, far-
reaching implications their programs would have. But this
does not explain why the government continued expanding the
programs as the decade wore on (e.g., Model Cities in 1966).

Piven and Cloward,[39] on the other hand, offer the follow-
ing quite different explanation:

> We ourselves do not believe that the stupidity
> or cupidity of particular leaders or their 'idea
> men' have much to do with the origin or fate of
> programs of such scale and duration. . . .
>
> Indeed, we think that the Great Society programs
> were promulgated by federal leaders in order to
> deal with the political problems created by a new
> and unstable electoral constituency, namely blacks--
> and to deal with this new constituency not simply
> by responding to its expressed interests, but by
> shaping and directing its political future.[40]

To reach, integrate and placate a growing (and potentially Democratic) constituency, the national Democratic administration of the 1960's acted to help blacks get more out of local government. To accomplish this, it had to reach past state and local governments and had to stimulate black demands for services. The method of doing this was to give blacks and the poor some decision making power (some participation) in the operation of federal anti-poverty programs.

In that process the federal government quite successfully directed rising black volatility into service protests against local government, instead of having to face broader, more militant demands. This also explains why CAP funds were the first federal funding programs which bypassed local government and went directly to community service groups. This was done to make sure that benefits reached ghetto voters, since the federal government fully realized that city government had become recalcitrant, obstructing the flow of services to black voters. Participation was believed to be the most effective way to promote local institutional change. For this reason, the Great Society programs went well beyond the customary rituals of participation common to the urban renewal program.

Instead of token representation, the federal programs channeled funds directly to groups forming in the ghetto, who quite often would harass city agencies. Needless to say, local officials were quite often very angry. One level of government was financing the harassment of another level.

At least as disturbing to municipal politicians, Piven and Cloward point out, were the "non-partisan" voter registration drives. To many local leaders it was incredible that voter registration in urban areas was being defined as a means to combat poverty. A rather incredulous and indignant Republican Mayor of Syracuse, N.Y. protested that it was "an exercise in helping Democrats rather than democracy."[42]

One of the unintended results of these federal programs was their high degree of success in assisting the poor to better organize themselves. It was quite often the most militant leaders who took full advantage of the federal programs.

> The people who drew the concept of 'participation' to its ultimate definition of political power were the local militants. And they were not the generalized spokesmen for the poor: they were the Negro and Spanish speaking activists left over from the civil rights movement. As a matter of fact they tended to be the newer, younger, more militant, more chauvinistic wing of the old civil rights movement.[43]

In many cases the emphasis on community action and participation successfully channeled dissatisfaction and unrest into issues and forms which can be more easily dealt with. The programs provided

> black groups essential sources of power and conflict and decision-making arenas in which the struggle for power could be fought out in the open and within the confines of the political system. One of the most significant power resources the government provided was a principle: that the poor should be involved in policy-making in programs that affect them. (my emphasis)[44]

Over a period of time, federal intervention had the effect of
absorbing and directing many of the agitated elements of the
black population. The process did not operate smoothly.
It was extremely intricate and confusing, but the Great Society
was a success from the perspective of integrating many blacks
into the system and thus neutralizing their potential militancy.

The Great Society programs certainly had very little
effect on the problem of poverty. So much conflict was generated
that poverty was all but forgotten. Even so, the many programs
facilitated the growth of community organizations which raised militant
demands for the first time, and these groups began to demand
control of organizations which directly affect their lives, giving
a new meaning to citizen participation. In 1964 citizen par-
ticipation could be included in legislation without stirring
a comment from anyone. By the end of the decade, this was no
longer possible.

7. The Response of the Planning Profession

Faced with great social turmoil, the emergence of steady
and often militant protest against their plans and redevelopment
schemes, and the ever growing demands by citizens for greater
control over the planning process, the planning profession by
the mid 1960's realized something was wrong, though they
were not quite sure what it was. In general, they responded
in two very different ways. Advocacy planning and a general
concern for "social planning,"[45] and new highly sophisticated

quantitative techniques emerged.[46]

Advocate planners felt that things would be better if planning was more open and responsive to the social needs of the plannees. Planning, Davidoff has said, must be "a practice which openly invites political and social values to be examined and debated" and there must be a "rejection of prescriptions for planning which would have the planner act solely as a technician."[47]

Advocate planners blamed the planning process for much of the trouble planners found themselves in during the 1960's.

> If the planning process is to encourage democratic urban government then it must operate so as to include rather than ex-clude citizens from participation in the process. 'Inclusion' means not only permit-ting the citizen to be heard. It also means that he be able to become well informed about the underlying reasons for planning proposals, and be able to respond to them in the tech-nical language of professional planners.[48]

If the social, economic and political ramifications of a plan are politically contentious, it was argued, then why not have those opposing it prepare their own counter plans. Professionals then could provide the necessary technical support for these additional plans by becoming "advocate planners" on behalf of the interests of a particular community. In this way citizens would participate by proposing concepts rather than simply reacting to agency programs. Davidoff points out:

> There is something very shameful to our society in the necessity to have organized 'citizen par-ticipation.' Such participation should be the

norm in an enlightened democracy. The formaliza-
tion of citizen participation as a required
practice in localities is similar in many re-
spects to totalitarian shows of loyalty to the
state by citizen parades.[49]

The response of the other group of planners was by no

means as sophisticated. If planning proposals are being vigorously

contested by the plannees, there must be something lacking in

the techniques used to develop plans. The solution was clear:

to make better plans, use better techniques. With the use of

complex simulation techniques and computational devices, a whole

host of sophisticated planning tools were added to the planners

bag of tricks.

Both responses, advocacy and social planning, and the new

doses of quantitative techniques, totally failed to deal with the

basic problem: the contradiction between the abstract ideal,

and the concrete reality of planning. It was not so much the

theoretical problems of the planning process nor the techniques

being used. The problem was and still is the interests being

served and promoted by planning in practice:

the real developers of the city use the fashion-
able ethos of city planning as window dressing
for their own profitable strategies--from major
urban renewal and highway projects to local
street widenings. Among the important urban
designers are real estate owners, builders and
construction contractors, automobile manu-
facturers and related industries, and the pri-
vate banks and institutions which dominate
'public' authorities by holding their bonds.[50]

The fundamental contradiction planners face is the large gap between their _ideology_ (of serving the "public interest," improving the quality of life for all through rational and comprehensive planning), and the reality of what they actually do (serve and promote the interests of a few at the expense of society).

Although planners usually recognize that planning decisions are political decisions, they do not fully understand the concrete meaning and implications this has in their everyday practice. This is one of the fundamental reasons why planning implementation has become so difficult. As Alan Kravitz points out, planners are used to

> facilitate the maintenance of upper class control over urban policy. What was ostensibly a liberal, reform-orientated approach to planning was, in reality, part of a conservative effort to maintain the political _status quo_ and to serve the interests of the powerful and propertied.[51]

When segments of the working class, the poor, and the minorities oppose certain plans and demand some control over decision making, they are not solely finding fault with the planning process or the techniques used, but with the specific interests and goals being served--interests and goals which quite often conflict with theirs. Unless the planning profession faces up to this contradiction between their liberal ideology and the conservative reality of their practice, they will continue to look in the wrong places for answers to their dilemmas and predicaments.

8. Participation in the 1970's

Over the past fifty years, participation has served a
number of different functions. It has been used to help sell the
notion of planning, to encourage self-help neighbourhood improve-
ment approaches, to deal with the problems of poverty, and has
been incorporated into advocacy planning approaches to help better
represent the interests of the poor and underprivileged.

Is this still the case today? What is the essence of
participation in the 1970's? What function does participation
serve under present social, political and economic conditions?
Is there more to participation than the idealized liberal demo-
cratic call for people to have a greater voice in decisions
affecting their lives? If so, there is a need for a better under-
standing of participation, not in terms of an idealized slogan,
but as an objective and realistic assessment of the functions
and limitations of participation today.

Understanding the current functions and ramifications
of participation is not merely a matter of academic curiosity.
It serves very practical interests, in that, if planners do not
understand the reality of participation, they won't be able to
tap its full potential and to avoid its problems.

The next two chapters attempt to place participation
into a broader perspective, which includes the social and eco-
nomic forces influencing the reasons behind government-sponsored
participation programs and the intended functions of these
programs.

CHAPTER II

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] In 1939, the name of the ACPI was changed to the American Institute of Planners (AIP) and in 1973 the name of the TPIC was changed to the Canadian Institute of Planners (CIP).

[2] Journal of the Town Planning Institute of Canada (JTPIC), 2(3), (May, 1923), 1.

[3] Thomas Adams, "Town and Regional Planning in Relation to Industrial Growth in Canada," JTPIC, 1(4-5),(June-August, 1921), 10.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Editorial, "A Demonstration Town for Ohio," JTPIC, 2(3), (May, 1923), 2-3.

[6] James Ewing, "The Uses of Town Planning," JTPIC, 1(4-5), (June-August, 1921), 5.

[7] George B. Ford, "Progress in Planning, 1925," JTPIC, 4(3), (June, 1925), 29.

[8] James Ewing, "The Need for Public Education," JTPIC, 1(4-5), (June-August, 1921), 5.

[9] Thomas Adams, "Need for a Constructive Policy in Regard to Town Planning," The City Plan, 1(2), (June, 1915), 2.

[10] Stanley H. Pickett, "Canadian Experience in Urban Renewal," Planning 1965, (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials (ASPO), 1965), 146-147.

[11] Charles H. Conrad, "Public Relations and Planning," Planning 1959, (Chicago: ASPO, 1959), 58.

[12] Herbert J. Gans, "Planning and Political Participation: A Study of Political Participation in a Planned New Town," Journal of the American Institute of Planners (JAIP), (Winter, 1953), 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14]Aaron Levine, "Citizen Participation," JAIP, (August, 1960), 196. (emphasis in the original)

[15]For a good example of how this latter point actually did work in one community, see: Norah Johnson, "Its Smart to Live in the Annex," Habitat, 5(1), (Jan.-Feb., 1962), 26-32. What planners of that day did not realize was that such community action only worked in stable middle class neighbourhoods, especially those having a high percentage of professionals.

[16]Bettie B. Sarchet and Eugene D. Wheeler, "Behind Neighborhood Plans: Citizens at Work," JAIP, 24(3), (1958), 187-195.

[17]City of Toronto Council members Sewell and Thomas proposed the city hire 33 organizers, three per ward, who would be independent of the Council.

[18]Housing Act of 1949, Sec. 2, 63 Stat. 413, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1441 (1964).

[19]Donald L. Foley, "Citizen Participation in American City Planning," Community Development, IX (1962), 35.

[20]Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967), x.

[21]Ibid., ix.

[22]Legislation quoted in: A.A. Foard and H. Fefferman, "Federal Urban Renewal Legislation," in Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy, James Q. Wilson, ed., (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966), 97.

[23]For example, see: Albert G. Rosenberg, "Baltimore's Harlem Park Finds 'Self-Help Citizen Participation is Successful," The Journal of Housing, 18(5), (May, 1961), 204-209.

[24]Edmund M. Burke, "Citizen Participation in Renewal," The Journal of Housing, 23(1), (January, 1966), 21.

[25]Quoted in Burke, Ibid., 20.

[26]Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, 81.

[27]Gerda Lewis, "Citizen Participation in Renewal Surveyed," The Journal of Housing, 16, (March, 1959), 81.

[28]James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal," JAIP, (Nov., 1963), 242-249.

[29]Ibid., 243.

[30]Ibid., 245.

[31]Ibid., 246.

[32]Ibid., 247.

[33]See: Lillian Rubin, "Maximum Feasible Participation: The Origins, Implications and Present Status," Poverty and Human Resources Abstract II, (Nov.-Dec., 1967), 5-18.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., 8.

[36]Paul Sweezy points out that there are two halves to the explanation of the causes of poverty. In the first place, "The process of capitalist development always and everywhere, in the most advanced metropolis as well as the most backward colony, generates wealth at one pole and want at the other." Secondly, "At the root of capitalist proverty, one finds unemployment and underdevelopment. . . . Negro unemployment was only 11 percent above white in 1940; it was 125 percent greater in 1962. The gap had grown ten fold." The War on Poverty did not in any way deal with the distribution of wealth in America nor with the high levels of constant unemployment. Paul Sweezy, "War on Poverty?" Monthly Review, (Feb., 1964), 533-535.

[37]Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: The Free Press, 1970), 170. (emphasis in the original) For a critical review of Moynihan's book, see: Charles F. Grosser, "Patrick's Complaint," Social Work, 14(3), (July, 1969), 111-115.

[38]Peter Marris and Martin Rien, Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States (New York: Atherton Press, 1967).

[39]Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), especially chapters 9 and 10.

[40]Ibid., 249

[41]That agitation was deliberately intended to be a method of reform also seemed clear to Nathan Glazer, who, in 1965 commented: "One of the most characteristic enterprises we have seen proposed in the Community Action Programs to fight poverty consists of efforts to increase pressure on government bureaucracies. . . . The best way to improve services is by attack from

the outside, rather by reform from the inside. When local government protests that federal money is used to attack it and its services, the federal administration will have to explain: but that is the only way to get you to do your job." Nathan Glazer, "Why are the poor still with us? Paradoxes of American Poverty," Public Interest, (Fall, 1965), 79-80.

[42] Quoted in Piven and Cloward, 267.

[43] Earl Raab, "A Tale of Three Wars: (3) What War and Which Poverty?" Public Interest, (Spring, 1966), 274.

[44] Peter Bachrach, quoted in Piven and Cloward, 274.

[45] For example: Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning" and Harvey S. Perloff, "New Directions in Social Planning" in the November, 1965 issue of the JAIP. In the March, 1966 issue; John W. Dyckman, "Social Planning, Social Planners and Planned Societies,"and in July, 1966, Robert Perlman's "Social Welfare Planning and Physical Planning."

[46] For example, the May, 1965 issue of the JAIP was devoted to "Urban Development Models: New Tools For Planning," and described techniques such as: opportunity accessibility models, retail market potential models, and simulation models for urban renewal programming and residential development. Through this entire period, the JAIP continually described new models, matrix methods, and gaming simulation for one thing or another.

[47] Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," JAIP, (November, 1965), 331.

[48] Ibid., 332.

[49] Ibid., 334.

[50] David Gurin, "City Planning," Our Generation, 5(2), (1967), 56.

[51] Alan S. Kravitz, "Mandarinism: Planning as Handmaiden to Conservative Politics," in Thad Beyle and George Lathrop, (eds.), Planning and Politics: Uneasy Partnership (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1970), 252.

CHAPTER III

PARTICIPATION AS A GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED ACTIVITY

1. Harmony vs. Conflict in the Theory of Society

An underlying assumption in almost everything being written
and said about citizen participation is the widely held view of
political power which states that the government is merely a
focal point for pressures from all parts of society, and that the
government, as a neutral force, adjudicates and resolves these
competing pressures.

This is known as the "democratic-pluralist" view on the
question of political authority and government in society.
Pluralism starts from an assumption that society is an aggregate
of individuals who come together in a number of different interest
groups to pursue their group interests. Power, therefore, is com-
petitive, fragmented and diffused. Everybody, directly or through
organized groups has some power and nobody has or can have too
much of it. As a result, the argument goes, no democratic gov-
ernemnt can fail, in the long run, in "balancing," and within the
limitations posed by the need for such balancing, to respond to
wishes and demands of competing interests. In the end everybody
gets served--a harmony of interests emerges. In the words of a
leading exponent of this view, "all the active and legitimate
groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial

stage in the process of decisions."[1]

A minor variation of this view, which can be referred to as "radical pluralism," recognizes that some groups, especially the disadvantaged and the poor, have no real voice in societal decision making. Thus there is the call for "participatory democracy" among liberals, social scientists, and other reform elements. While such a concept holds that not all interests in society receive equal treatment, it does hold that there is or at least there is the possibility of, a harmony of interests which will be realized if all groups of people are able to have a say (i.e., participate) in decision making.

It is this view of pluralism that underlies, for example, advocacy planning. Advocacy is seen as a corrective mechanism for the pluralist process, a process which is, at the present time, malfunctioning by not including all interests. Davidoff, for example, claims that:

> Pluralism and advocacy are means for stimulating consideration of future conditions by all groups in society. But there is one social group which at present is particularly in need of the assistance of planners. This group includes organizations representing low income families. (emphasis added)[2]

Since powerful interests have monopolized technical knowledge, and since the poor cannot therefore adequately challenge political decisions, as they lack these technical skills, advocate planners take it upon themselves to politicize the planning process and to provide technical resources to the deprived communities. This will, it is claimed, make pluralism work once again and eventually

lead to a more equtable and just society.

The arguments used in promoting advocacy planning are the same used to promote citizen participation. In the case of participation, it is not merely technical skills which are lacking, but the ability of certain segments of society to have any direct influence over decision making, especially in decisions which affect them directly. Once the proper mechanisms are found which permit citizen participation to take place, pluralism will once again be functioning and the numerous major confrontations taking place between groups of citizens and officials will no longer be necessary.

If the pluralist theory of the state were correct, this might indeed happen. But is the pluralist theory a plausible characterization of current society?

Ralph Miliband, in his study, The State in Capitalist Society, points out that "the pluralist-democratic view of society, of politics and of the state in regard to the countries of advanced capitalism, is in all essentials wrong. . . . This view, far from providing a guide to reality, constitutes a profound obfuscation of it."[3] The very fact that the orderly maintenance of our society depends upon the existence of the state as an institution with a monopoly over force, is a recognition of the fact there are irreconcilable conflicts between classes within society-- not a harmony of interests. In order that these antagonisms might not develop to the point of destroying the fabric of society, a power seemingly standing above society is necessary in order to moderate the conflict and to keep it within the bounds of

"order." This power is the state.[4] The state is both the product of, and the manifestation of, the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. Had these antagonisms been reconcilable, as the pluralists contend, there would not be a state in the form we know it now, that is, a capitalist state.

The cause of this irreconcilable conflict between classes is the institution of private property and its corollary in economic organization: the private production and exchange of commodities. To create "order" which legalizes and perpetuates these property relations, the state uses its force to moderate class conflict on behalf of the dominant classes, i.e., the classes which control society's wealth and its productive forces.

This view of the nature of the state is vastly different from that of the pluralists, for here the state is not seen as a neutral referee reconciling different interests, but as a force which mediates conflict in the interest of the dominant classes in society. The state, therefore, is a guarantor of capitalist property property relations and not an institution established to pursue the welfare of "society as a whole."

This is an extremely crucial distinction to make in analyzing citizen participation and the government's role and function in organizing citizen participation programs. Most planning activity simply assumes that the pluralist view is correct and planning programs and policies are therefore built around this implicit assumption. In analyzing participation, this paper rejects the pluralist view of the state. Though it is not the purpose

here to develop a full analysis of the role of the state,[5] it
is necessary to clarify it and make it explicit as a starting
point in analyzing government-organized participation activities.

The state performs three fundamental functions in ad-
vanced capitalist society:

1) The state guarantees that the rules imbedded in
some basic socio-economic institutions are followed,
and that the resulting social relations are maintained
and reproduced. Socio-economic institutions refer to
such things as the labour market, private commodity
production, the exchange economy, and the like. These
"rules of the social game" must be enforced and their
status as unchallengable institutions must be maintained
if the social order is to reproduce and perpetuate
itself.[6]

2) The state is the supreme, organized and institu-
tionalized expression of force in society. It has a
monopoly over the "legitimate" use of violence as a last
resort in perpetuating the basic socio-economic institu-
tions and maintaining the fabric of society intact.

3) The state assumes the responsiblilty of complement-
ing these core institutions by politically decided
actions.[7] When the institutions fail to resolve re-
current conflicts or fail to guarantee the production
and distribution of goods and services necessary for

maintaining and reproducing the capitalist social
order, the state intervenes with public programs
and policies to support and complement these core
institutions.

It is within this third function--state intervention for
the purpose of complementing core institutions--that the problems
planners deal with are located. The activities of planners pri-
marily involve the design of programs and policies which facilitate
state intervention in many of the core institutions of society.
It is this third function, therefore, that will concern us here
in our analysis of the government's role in sponsoring citizen
participation programs.

2. The Nature of State Intervention

One measure of state intervention is the size of government
budgets. During the past half century or so, government expen-
ditures have increased absolutely and in relation to GNP in all
advanced capitalist countries. In Canada, total government spend-
ing increased from 14.5% to 44.8% of the GNP between 1926 and
1971. In current dollars, government expenditures in 1926 were
$750 million, while by 1971, they had reached $41.8 billion.

There have been similar increases in all the major western
capitalist countries. Total government spending in the United
States increased from 8% to over 30% of GNP between 1890 and 1960.
During the same period, British and German government spending

rose from 10 to 40 percent and from 13 to 45 percent respectively.[9]
The growth in local government expenditures in Canada during the
past 20 years has been equally remarkable--an increase of more
than 800 percent in current dollars or more than 200 percent
in constant-dollar-per-capita terms.[10]

In addition to this quantitative measure of the growth
of government intervention (that is, the increased budgetary ex-
penditures), there are also the ever increasing varieties of
institutions in which the government intervenes in the form of
legislation, planning, arbitration, and the imposition of all kinds
of controls and regulations.

What are all these public funds being spent on and why
has there been such an enormous increase in government intervention
over the years? This huge expansion of government intervention
has become necessary because of the changing nature of capitalist
society and the capitalist economy. The following three principal
state functions have emerged since the end of the 19th century
and show why state intervention has had to be expanded and in-
tensified:

1) to redress grievances and inequalities emerging
as a matter of course in early capitalist society,
hence to stabilize the social order and prevent class
conflicts from exploding into disruptive confrontations;

2) to contain the crises caused by irrationalities
imbedded in the laws of motion of early capitalist
society--crises which affect not only the working

class but the owning class as well. The fundamental irrationalities are: production for exchange and not to meet social needs; anarchic production decisions leading to periodic booms and busts; and market competition leading to the extermination of small business and the emergence of multinational firms; and

3) to provide public goods, such as roads, railroads, ports, power stations, schools, parks, research and development, and so on, whose production is unprofitable and hence impossible in the private sector, but whose provision is imperative for the continued profitability of private production.

All three functions could hardly be fulfilled by a weak laissez-faire government and all three call for more and more state intervention. Government budgets have continously expanded as a result of the increasingly complex and interdependent nature of modern industrial production, which demands greater and greater quantities of public services and social programs--services and programs which can only be funded by the government. In short, the growth of the public sector has become indispensable to the profitable expansion of capitalist production.

One major element of government spending is the category of expenditures called <u>social capital</u>, that is, expenditures required for profitable private accumulation. There are two kinds of social capital: social investment and social consumption.

Social investment consists of projects and services that increase the productivity of industry and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit (or at least combat the tendency of profits to decline). Examples of social investment include physical infrastructure such as: highways, airports, railroads, ports and other transportation facilities; electric, gas, water and sewer projects; plant and equipment for education and research and development; investments in water and land improvements; and urban renewal projects such as commercial structures, parking facilities, convention centers, sport stadiums, and the like. In addition, social investment includes human capital expenditures consisting of teaching, administrative, and other services at all levels of the education system, and scientific and research and development services both inside and outside the educational establishment.

Social consumption consists of projects and services necessary for the reproduction of the labour force, and if possible, increasing the productivity of labour. Social consumption outlays can be classified into two groups: 1) goods and services consumed collectively by society, and 2) social insurance against economic insecurity. The first group includes such things as suburban development projects (roads, schools, recreational facilities, subsidized home mortgages), urban development projects (mass transit, commuter facilities, urban expressways) and other related projects such as day care, hospital and medical facilities. The second group, social insurance against economic insecurity,

includes workman's compensation, old age and survivors' insurance, unemployment insurance, and medical and health insurance.

It should be noted that nearly every government expenditure has a twofold character, that is, they are often both social investment and social consumption. Furthermore, nearly every government expenditure serves several purposes simultaneously, so that few outlays can be classified unambiguously. For example, expressways move workers to and from work and are therefore items of social consumption, but they also transport commercial freight and are therefore a form of social investment. However, despite this complex character of government expenditures, we can still determine the primary political-economic forces served by any budgetary decision, and thus the main purpose (or purposes) of each budgetary item.[11]

Both of these categories of social capital--social investment and social consumption--have become necessary for the maintenance of an "acceptable" rate of profit in the private sector, due to the scale and the increasingly complex nature of modern production. Over the years, the private sector has successfully socialized (made public) part or all of the costs of planning, construction, developing and modernizing all the physical infrastructure (social investment) listed above. Also many of the costs of maintaining and reproducing a stable workforce (the social consumption items listed above) have been increasingly absorbed by the public sector. With the public paying more and more of the direct and indirect costs of production, private sector

expenses get reduced (or at least stabilized). Thus, other factors being equal, rates of profit in the private sector increase (or at least do not decline).[12]

One of the primary forces causing such a shift of costs to the public sector is the emergence of the monopoly sector of the economy. Previously, the economy consisted of the public sector and the private competitive sector. But over the past seventy to eighty years, a small number of large corporations have come to dominate most key industries. For example, capital goods such as steel, aluminum, oil, copper, chemicals and electrical equipment; consumer goods such as automobiles, appliances and various food products; transportation industries such as railroads, airlines, and branches of shipping, are progressively being dominated by huge trusts, not infrequently multinational in character.

Today, the private sector consists of both competitive industries and monopolistic industries. In monopoly industries, unlike most competitive sector industries, production is typically large-scale, markets are typically national or international, and there is a great dependency of technical progress and on highly skilled blue and white collar workers. Thus, in order to function and prosper, the monopoly sector requires national transportation networks, modernized ports, railroads, airports; large scale water, sewer and power facilities; vast educational systems to train the necessary technical and administrative workers; and subsidized urban and suburban development in order to house

workers and locate new offices and factories.

All of these are costs which no individual or even groups
of individual monopoly sector industries could ever pay for them-
selves, and yet without which, they could not remain in profitable
business.

This has led James O'Connor to argue that "the growth of
the state sector and state spending is functioning increasingly
as the basis for the growth of the monopoly sector and total pro-
duction. Conversely, . . . the growth of state spending and state
programs is the result of the growth of the monopoly industries."[13]
In other words, he argues that the growth of the monopoly and
state sectors has now become a single process. One requires the
other in order to exist.

This would be fine if no severe social problems were created
in the process. But such problems do arise.

First, although a typical monopoly industry "in itself"
may be quite efficient and profitable, the impact the monopoly
sector as a whole has upon society is quite negative. The growth
of the monopoly sector is irrational in the sense that it engenders
spiraling inflation and unemployment; distorts production priorities
and subdues social benefits to the logic of profit; creates arti-
ficial and contrived shortages in essential goods and services;
despoils the environment, sometimes permanently; and leads to
economic warfare between regions and nations.

Second, not only does the monopoly sector require the huge
increases in the social capital expenditures outlined above,
but also causes sharp increases in the second primary category

of public expenditures, that is, social expenses.

Social expenses consist of projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony. They are not even indirectly productive, but are an expense caused by the ability of the monopoly sector to expand productivity and productive capacity more rapidly than the demand for labour and employment. The best example of a social expense is the welfare system, which is designed chiefly to keep social peace among unemployed workers. As the monopoly sector of the economy grows, the welfare state tends to also expand due to the growth of the surplus population which has relatively little purchasing power of its own, and must increasingly depend upon public subsidies. Although many conservatives tend to oppose expenditures for the welfare state, much of the monopoly sector supports and promotes these social expenses (e.g., through the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the like) since they know that if the surplus population is not controlled, social and political disorder results and is more than likely to disrupt orderly economic expansion.

A third major problem caused by the growth of the monopoly and state sectors is one of government finances: where is all the money for these ever expanding public expenditures to come from? Though the government has socialized more and more of the costs of production in the private sector, the benefits (i.e., the profits) from these public expenditures remain private. This socialization of costs and private appropriation of profits creates a fiscal crisis, or "budgetary gap," between government expenditures and government revenues. The result is a tendency

for government expenditures to increase more rapidly than the means of financing them.

Understanding the fiscal crisis, the dynamics leading to it, and the typical responses of government to it, is crucial to an analysis of participation, for, as the fiscal crisis worsens, more and more social consumption expenditures in government budgets must be cut, which often causes protest movements to spring up. Likewise, as social capital expenditures increase (for the provision of expressways, airports, power plants, dams, civic centers, etc.), the negative side affects increasingly anger the people affected, again causing citizen protest to develop. We therefore turn to a detailed consideration of the fiscal crisis.

3. The Fiscal Crisis

The fiscal crisis consists of the increasing gap between government expenditures and revenues. As we have seen, government expenditures have been increasing at a phenomenal rate. This growth of the public sector has become indispensable to the expansion of private industry, particularly to the monopoly sector. In addition to these social capital expenditures, the growth of the monopoly sector, due to its inherent irrationalities, has also generated increased expansion of social expenses. The fact that the private sector has effectively socialized more and more of these costs of production, while profits are not socialized but remain privately appropriated, has caused a growing

fiscal crisis (budgetary gap) between government expenditures and revenues. The government has been forced to spend more than it can raise, while at the same time it has not been able to re-capture the benefits (the profits) from all these additional ex-penditures in order to be able to plow them back into the public sector.

This fiscal crisis is exacerbated all the more by the private appropriation of government power for particularistic ends. A host of "special interests," such as corporations, industries, regional and other business interests, constantly make claims on the budget for various kinds of social investment. Since few of these various claims are properly coordinated be-tween the different levels and agencies of government, there is a great deal of waste, duplication and overlapping of government-sponsored projects and services, thus, intensifying an already serious fiscal crisis.

In the past the solution to growing government deficits was simply to raise taxes or create new forms of taxation. But this is no longer possible. There are both political and economic forces which limit the taxable capacity of the population. As one economist points out, "Taxation will reach a practical level when the political and social resistance by taxpayers becomes so serious that the government is prevented from imposing an additional tax burden."[14] All levels of government are facing various de-grees of widespread taxpayer revolt--demands that tax rates not be raised and that budgets be cut and programs eliminated. This is especially prevelant at the local levels, where the primary

taxes--property and sales taxes--are extremely regressive in
nature. In addition, there are fundamental macroeconomic con-
siderations which effectively rule out the possibility of un-
limited taxation. The dynamics of inflation and recession are
such that increased taxes reduce the purchasing capacity of the
working population, which reduces effective demand, resulting in
a curtailing of investment, which can then culminate in a re-
cession. This can hardly be counteracted by artificially increasing
the money supply without setting in motion a spiral of inflation,
leading to even more unsettling social problems.

Scope of the Crisis.--As TABLE 1 indicates, all levels of
government in Canada have been incurring a large number of de-
ficits during the past 20 years. The municipal level has been
especially hard hit. While local government expenditures in-

TABLE 1

FISCAL DEFICIT OR SURPLUS, BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, 1950-1970

Level of Government	Number of Surpluses	Number of Deficits
Federal	11	10
Provincial	8	13
Municipal	1	20
Consolidated	8	13

SOURCE: R. Denton,"The Fiscal Crisis of the State," in
The Political Economy of the State, D.I. Roussopoulos (ed.),
Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1973, p.41.

creased more than 800% during the past 20 years, locally raised
revenues grew only 500%.[15] Municipal spending has been in-
creasingly financed by transfers of funds from the provincial

and federal levels (see TABLE 2). These transfers increased

about 1800%, from 23% of total municipal revenues in 1952 to

48% in 1972.

In addition the gap between revenues and expenditures is

likely to grow in the future. Ontario's Minister of Finance,

TABLE 2

Total Revenue Transfers to Other Levels
       of Government: Canada

1946	$260 million
1951	$469 million
1956	$865 million
1961	$2,697 million
1966	$4,756 million
1967	$5,608 million
1968	$6,448 million
1969	$7,287 million
1970	$8,805 million
1971	$10,420 million

SOURCE: Canadian Statistical Review:
Historical Summary 1970, Statistics
Canada, August, 1972, p.24.

John White, points out that: "Despite massive infusions of pro-

vincial money in recent years, the local government sector still

faces a growing deficit each year. At current levels of service,

and after normal growth in existing grant programs, the local

sector deficit in Ontario is forecast as follows:

1974	$160 million
1975	$350 million
1976	$500 million."[17]

Government deficits will continue to increase, because, as White

points out, "Local levies grow at 4-5% each year without rate in-

creases while existing spending responsibilities grow at 10-12%

per year."[18]   In addition, Ontario's Minister of Finance points
out that the

> expenditures of the provinces and municipalities
> have long exceeded their revenues, leaving them
> in a state of chronic deficit in spite of regular
> tax increases. The provincial-municipal sector is
> already underfinanced by more than three billion
> dollars in 1972-73. Without additional tax sharing
> this position will continue to deteriorate, since
> expenditure growth continues to outstrip normal
> growth in revenues.[19]

The situation is similar, if not worse, in the United
States. Federal grants to local governments increased from $7
billion in 1961 to $30 billion in 1971, a 330% increase in just
ten years. Even with all these federal grants, state and local
government debt outstanding between 1960 and 1969 increased in
absolute terms from $42 billion to $80 billion. Township, special
authority and other debt outstanding rose from $28 to $64 billion
during the same period. In terms of the volume of annual bond
issues, state and local borrowing jumped from $2 billion yearly in
1945 to $16 billion in 1968, subsequently skyrocketing to $23
billion in 1971.[21]   Furthermore, the estimated fiscal gap (i.e.,
revenue shortage) for the local government sector in the United
States is predicted to increase from $4.5 billion to $50 billion
between 1966 and 1976--an increase of over 1000% in only ten years.[22]

4. Social Ramifications of the Fiscal Crisis

The fiscal crisis, however, is not solely a budgetary pro-
blem: it has far reaching social and political ramifications.
How can the state continue to fulfill its function of increasing

expenditures in order to complement core institutions (to help expand the economy and keep social peace) when it is having trouble providing even the more basic traditional services? More and better traditional services (police, fire, education, etc.) are being demanded while other new or greatly expnaded services (transit, welfare, etc.) have also required greater and greater expenditures. In the words of one municipal expert:

> For a few cities, the situation has become pre-
> carious indeed: service needs are greater than
> their present ability to raise revenues.
> The outcome of these trends has been the
> impairment of local government's ability to pro-
> vide desired increases in municipal services or,
> in many cities, to even maintain existing services
> at their current levels.[23]

Social crises result from these fiscal problems in that more and more struggles are being directed at the state itself, while due to the fiscal crisis, the state cannot meet most of these demands. Because of the large number of social and economic problems facing people today (inflation, decline in real wages, unemployment, inadequate public services, and so on), every economic and social class or group wants government to spend more money on more things. Public employees are now highly unionized and are demanding better wages and working conditions. Welfare re-cipients, the unemployed and even old age pensioners are all or-ganized and demanding a better deal. Public housing tenants, neighbourhood associations and various pressure groups are demand-ing better housing, recreational facilities, neighbourhood amenities, police protection, and so on. All this is in addition to the expanding needs of the monopoly sector.

In the past, when some special interest or some social group requested or demanded additional funds for a particular purpose, government could at least temporarily, or in a token way, accommodate these needs since there was no severe shortage of funds or no severe strain on the limits to increased taxation. Public services could be properly maintained and social conflict could be kept to a minimum because government had little trouble meeting some if not most of the serious demands placed on it. Likewise there was no problem in spending additional money if some unforeseen social or economic problem erupted. This is certainly one of the reasons why there was so little serious conflict in the 1940's and 1950's and the early 1960's. Most needs were either met, or else potentially serious problems were well enough contained and pacified.

Today, however, the state has to deal with the fiscal crisis and the problem of inflation, and on top of all this, it has to deal with the problem of insurgency and radical movements among the surplus population: that is, movements among the poor, minority groups, women, youth and other sectors of the population who are demanding basic changes in society, especially institutional changes that will alter the distribution of income and economic opportunities in their favour.

Due to the fiscal crisis, the state cannot freely dish out funds to meet these needs and to contain these struggles as easily as it once could. The root problem of the social crisis is this: how to contain social turmoil and deal with demands for an

improving, or at least stable, standard of living, given the severe financial constraints on new government spending caused by the fiscal crisis. The following section outlines the alternative courses of action open to the modern capitalist state. This is then followed by an analysis of where citizen participation, as a government sponsored activity, fits into the available alternatives.

5. Methods of Dealing with the Fiscal Crisis

There logically appears to be four possibilities open to the state in its attempt to deal with the fiscal crisis and the social and political ramifications which result from it.

1) Oppression--the open use of the police and military powers to maintain social and political order. This is a method of last resort and, except for minor uses of police power (strike breaking, containing demonstrations, politically motivated arrests, and the like), is only used when all other alternatives fail.

2) Technical Manipulations--the use of various inflationary policies, wage and price controls, freezes on government spending and government employment, attempts to raise overall productivity, and the like. These are already in use and have proved to be of limited usefulness. Their greatest usefulness is ideological: they are introduced with fanfare to

at least make it appear that the government is
doing something about the problem.

3) Rationalization and Planning--introduction of new
programs and policies which make better and more
efficient use of the finite government resources (e.g.,
budgetary measures such as PPBS, and the introduction
of regional government and regional authorities in
order to eliminate duplication of services and to ra-
tionalize expenditures). In short, the fiscal squeeze
requires more collective action and planning. As one
government study points out, "we are entering a new era
in public administration" in which "efficiency, rationality,
comprehensiveness, control, planning, anticipation" have
become "the central or core values which will underlie
the public decision making process."[24] Program budgeting
(PPBS), for example, which was introduced in the mid-1960's,
is a device for steering the economy as a whole and cen-
tralizing and coordinating government expenditures as much
as possible.[25]

4) Legitimation--the state must try to integrate all
elements of the population into a coherent system, win
mass loyality, and legitimize itself and society. To this
end the government attempts to administer and bureaucra-
tize (encapsulate) not only private sector labour-manage-
ment conflict (as it has been doing) but also social-
political conflict emerging from public sector workers

and the surplus population. The basic problem is to
win support for the government's programs and policies--
in spite of the spending limitations caused by the
fiscal crisis.

What is the relationship between these four methods of dealing
with the fiscal and social crisis, on the one hand, and citizen
participation programs and activities, on the other? To this
we now turn.

6. Participation and the Social Crisis

In the following discussion and in Chapter IV, it is argued
that citizen participation serves two functions: legitimation
and rationalization and planning. Furthermore, the relationships
between these two functions are investigated.

Participation as legitimation.--In the past, before the
fiscal crisis had reached serious proportions, the problems of
maintaining widespread loyalty to, and acceptance of, the cap-
italist social order, were much simpler to grapple with. Legi-
timacy came in the form of delivery. As long as the state was
able to meet social demands by "delivering" more services, new
methods of legitimation were not necessary. Social and political
stability could be maintained by meeting at least some if not
most of the needs and demands raised. Government spending and
increased government intervention in the form of regulations,
controls, licensing, and so forth, could be increased without

a great deal of difficulty. But the fiscal crisis has changed
all this. Delivery is becoming increasingly difficult while,
at the same time, the demands for government spending are dra-
matically rising. With delivery becoming so difficult, a new
legitimizing process was called for. To a very large extent,
the creation and organization of fairly sophisticated citizen
participation programs has become the best current attempt at
meeting this need.[26]

Participation programs create an arena in which all types
of individuals and social groups are brought together in order
to consider and study a specific problem or set of problems.
When citizens are invited to participate in this way, they are
in effect led to believe that the government's problems are also
their own problems. Instead of having to spend money to meet
certain needs, the government invites citizens to study the
problem, and to see that there are fiscal constraints on solving
it, thereby hoping that "responsible" citizens would compromise
their demands and/or better understand why certain demands are
"impossible" to meet. It is important for the government under
these circumstances to dispel the notion that it has an infinite
capacity to deliver the goods, and that the failure of the govern-
ment to deliver is not due to insensitivity or misplaced
priorities or the fact that it is serving corporate interests
rather than public interests. Public participation programs,
properly organized, are usually capable of accomplishing this--
at least for the majority of the participants. Legitimacy is

thereby gained by having the citizen better understand the problems and the constraints on the government's ability to do anything about it. An official study commissioned by the Ontario Government states that

> participation tends to stamp government activity with legitimacy. . . . Paticipation serves as a safety valve to diffuse or neutralize dissidence. When dissidents are allowed to participate, they come to feel the full weight of either the acceptance or rejection of the majority opinion. They will be less careless in gauging what the majority wishes. They will also become more sensitive to, and accepting of, the average opinion and come to accept the procedures for differing with and changing this majority opinion. Only persons who live outside of the political community have no stake in it.[27]

This method of using citizen participation to legitimate government action (or inaction) has the possibility of being successful because it further promotes public belief in three basic fallacies:

1) it posits all sorts of constraints on government action as if all these constraints were immutable, i.e., in the "nature of things";

2) it promotes and strengthens the fallacy of pluralism--that the government really serves the "public interest"; and,

3) it creates and reinforces the illusion that one group's demands are impossible to meet because other groups have equally pressing demands,

resulting in a "divide and conquer"

strategy--i.e., "fight your neighbours,

not us."

In any participatory process the government must put forward a certain amount of information and data pertaining to the problem at hand. The selective use of information and the definition of possible solutions have the effect of placing constraints on the scope and possible decisions made by those participating. Therefore, with the government doing its best to define the constraints, basic questions which ask _why_ there are so many constraints, why is there a fiscal crisis, why can't the rates of profit be diminished, and so on--are usually never asked and are placed beyond the scope of the matter at hand.

People are lead to believe that there simply are, for unavoidable reasons, numerous constraints which simply cannot be overcome. Once people perceive the problem and the possible solutions in a very narrow sense, having accepted numerous constraints (both explicit and implicit) as immutable, they are unable to imagine any other alternative possibilities and must accept the scope and type of alternatives offered by the government. This is one reason there is so much written and said about all the various "dilemmas" we face today -- "the urban dilemma," "the housing dilemma," "the poverty dilemma"--the solutions to any problem can become a "dilemma" if numerous immutable constraints are imposed on the range of possible solutions.

Another result of accepting numerous constraints as given, is the traditional way planners are trained to think and talk of "trade-offs," by which they mean the necessity to sacrifice one objective in favour of another, as if, by a law of nature, both cannot be achieved. Trading-off, as a mode of decision making, makes sense only when a number of constraints are accepted as insurmountable and unavoidable. Planners are probably more accurately described as professional "traders-off" and not planners if by planning we mean, in constrast to management and administration, the progressive inclusion within the scope of human choice and decision, matters that earlier appeared as constraints or unavoidable outcomes.

The second fallacy promoted by participation programs is that of pluralism--that all groups and interests in the population have an equal chance of making themselves heard in the decision making process and that the state promotes the welfare of society as a whole. Needless to say, if most people did not believe in the pluralist view and believed, rather, that capitalist society is composed of classes with the state protecting the interests of the dominant ones, much more than participation programs would be needed to maintain the legitimacy and stability of the current social and economic order. In this case, the first method of dealing with the fiscal and social crises listed earlier-- oppression--would probably be needed to maintain order.[28] But as long as the false belief that pluralism is a reality can be maintained, the open use of force remains unnecessary.

Citizen participation programs are based on the same myth they seek to perpetuate: pluralism. They bring citizens together and lead them to believe that they really _are_ having an effect on government policy and that their needs and problems are at least being given full consideration.

The third basic fallacy promoted by participation programs often results in a "divide and conquer" outcome. When a group of participants have accepted the various constraints and funding limitations set by the government, the need to decide who gets a share of these "limited" resources can cause the participating groups to fight among themselves. No longer is the government seen as the source of the problem, but other social groups are now the source of the problem. In this way, one social group, minority, or neighbourhood organization is played off against another or against another faction within its own group.

"Divide and conquer" is quite often a result of a participatory program even if it hasn't been planned to start with. By the very fact that groups and individuals with diverse and often conflicting interests are brought together and must work together on a usually controversial issue, means that fights between participants will often occur. When this happens, the government has a perfect excuse to drop the entire participation process and to proceed as it pleases independent of citizens. Or, if it is an issue of minor importance, the citizens can simply be allowed to fight among themselves as long as they wish.

An example of this is the Neighbourhood Improvement Program (NIP) introduced in 1973 by the Canadian government as a

replacement for the old urban renewal program. NIP calls for
a high degree of participation among residents of the designated
neighbourhoods. One problem is that the program has very limited
funding so that only a very small number of neighbourhoods can
become designated for improvement grants. Another problem is that
all the diverse interest groups within an area (neighbourhood
residents, businessmen, local industries, landlords, tenants)
must somehow work together (participate) and jointly agree on
how the money is to be spent in their area. As a Federal brochure
on the NIP program explains:

> This program is intended to emphasize the local
> role in selecting neighborhoods and in developing
> and implementing plans within the limits of pre-
> determined funds . . .

> [P]articipation of the residents in the program
> for the neighborhood is seen as a very important
> factor. . . . it is provincial and local authori-
> ties who determine the most effective means for
> ensuring such participation.[29] (my emphasis)

What has happened is that neighbourhoods often fight each other
for a NIP designation. Once they have it, they fight the other
NIP areas for a greater percentage of the local NIP funds. And
finally, once they have the money, neighbourhood NIP committees
fight among themselves in deciding how the money is to be spent.
Each different group has its own interests to promote. An empty
lot can be a new parking lot for the businessmen, a park for the
residents, or room for expansion of a local industry. The resi-
dential areas want streets closed to prevent heavy through traffic,
while businessmen and industries want better access. And so on.

Once these three basic fallacies are propagated among
participants, the participation process can then proceed to
co-opt the efforts of various groups in an attempt to reach a
"solution" "acceptable" to everyone, simply because everybody
can now be shown how a better solution is not feasible, or is
not attainable due to technical imperatives, "lack" of resources,
or divisions within the group itself. Officials can then
claim that the lack of a solution is not due to the non-re-
sponsiveness of a bureaucracy or a real bias in favour of one
group as opposed to another. They simply leave it up to those par-
ticipating to study the data, analyze the problem within the
given constraints and then, if possible, decide on a"feasible"
and "responsible" solution.

Participation as rationalization and planning.--The legi-
timation function of participation programs, however, is not a
straight-forward or simple type of process. Participation, by
definition, is a time-consuming and often costly process in-
volving people who lack any high degree of technical expertise
in dealing with a given problem. "Economically," the process is,
therefore, quite inefficient. To this extent, participation,
as a means of dealing with the fiscal crisis and its social and
political consequences, might appear to be incompatable with another
important means: rationalization and planning. The latter calls
for the use of a great deal of strong-handed technical expertise
to solve problems and to better allocate limited resources. To
accomplish this, decisions must be made quickly and decisively and

proceed according to a preplanned technical scheme.

This conflict between "inefficient" participation for the sake of legitimation and the technical rationality of public finance and resource allocation, partially explains the great vascillation on the part of officials in launching citizen participation programs. The legitimizing value of participation must be balanced against the compromising effects it will have on the rationalization and technical planning processes. Hence, officials, especially the more technically orientated ones, tend to hesitate when it comes to including a high degree of participation in a planning or decision making process. Also, at some point in a participation program, officials may feel tempted to terminate prematurely the participatory process, recognizing that there is the danger of undermining the legitimizing function, but being driven to it for the sake of the much more efficient rationalization and planning types of solutions.

Thus citizen participation finds itself in a difficult position in terms of the fiscal crisis. Government is sometimes forced into a participatory process by citizens and organized groups for the various political reasons explained previously in Chapter II. It also sometimes voluntarily chooses to initiate a participatory process for the legitimation reasons listed above and when it (government) feels it is in its interest to do so. But in either case there is a compromising of the rationalization and planning process. This partially explains the tensions which almost always exist between the experts and the citizens. The

problem from the official's point of view is where do you strike the balance in a particular situation. This is a question which faces all citizen participation programs.

However, citizen participation still, in a totally different way, can be manipulated to serve and complement the rationalization and technical planning process. This grows from the recognition that expert rationalization can be aborted if the experts don't take into account political factors in the planning process. Many of the most comprehensive and technically competent plans have been blocked by angry protest from citizens and orgainzed groups of citizens. (For example, expressways, power plants, urban renewal schemes, new airports, rezonings-- just to name a few.) The state had to learn the lesson by bitter experience. It had to extend its narrow conception of technical rationality to embrace the technology of political pulse sensing.

Without taking into consideration the political constraints of a given course of action, a great deal of time, money and effort could go down the drain--which defeats the entire purpose of rationalization and planning as a means of coping with the fiscal crisis. It could simply end up worsening the problem and the fiscal crisis if plans are continually aborted by last minute protest. An example of this, the Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review, is presented in the following chapter.

Thus, from this vantage point, legitimation and rationalization are not fully incompatable. Public participation is a means by which the planning process can be expanded to include

the major political factors and constraints which are necessary
to help prevent the entire plan or proposal from being aborted
by well organized citizen protest. It is this aspect of par-
ticipation programs--its function in the traditional planning
process--which the next chapter examines.

CHAPTER III

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1]Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 137-138.

[2]Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," JAIP,(November, 1965), 334.

[3]Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power (London: Quartet Books, 1969), 6.

[4]The "state" is defined here as referring, not only to the political and administrative structure of the government, but also to all aspects of control over society: parliament, the parties, the military, and the police. The "government," on the other hand, refers primarily to the political and administrative decision making aspects of the state.

[5]For a full analysis of the state, see Miliband; for a more rigorous exposition of the basic issues surrounding theories of the state, see: Claus Offe, "Political Authority and Class Structures--An Analysis of Late Capitalist Societies," International Journal of Sociology, 2,(1972-73), 73-108.

[6]For an elaboration, see: Richard C. Edwards, et.al., "A Radical Approach to Economics," in Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Perspective, David M. Gordon, ed., (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), 13-24.

[7]"Core institutions" refer to those institutions basic to capitalism: the market in labour, in which labour is treated as a commodity; control of production and of the work process by those who own and control capital; the legal relations of private ownership; the exchange economy and the system of individual gain incentives; and, the ideology which abstracts and organizes "reality" in such a way as to justify and facilitate the operation of the other institutions.

[8]Canadian Statistical Review: Historical Summary 1970, Statistics Canada, 1972.

[9] James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 97.

[10] John White, A Position Paper on Public Finance, Ministry of Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, Ontario Government, 1973, 1.

[11] See O'Connor, Chapters 4 through 6.

[12] There is a tendency in capitalism for the rate of profit to decline. As the economy accumulates more and more productive plant and equipment, the rate of return on new and existing capital becomes depressed. Therefore, the rate of profit can only be maintained or increased if the public sector absorbs more and more of the costs of production. See: Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (London: Merlin Press, 1971), pages 166-170, "The Tendency of the Averge Rate of Profit to Fall."

[13] O'Connor, 8.

[14] Sei Fujita, "Political Ceiling on Income Taxation," Public Finance, 16(2), 1961, 183.

[15] White, 2.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid., 4.

[18] Ibid., 2.

[19] John White, "Fiscal Policy Management and Tax Sharing Reform," Ontario Economic Review, 11(1), Jan.-Feb., 1973, 5.

[20] Municipal Yearbook 1972, International City Managers Association, 1972, 284.

[21] "Planned and Actual Long-term Borrowing by State and Local Governments," Federal Reserve Bulletin, (December, 1972), 977.

[22] Municipal Yearbook 1972, 283.

[23] John Pajour, "Local Government Fiscal Conditions," Municipal Yearbook 1972, 281.

[24] Citizen Involvement: A Working Paper Prepared for the Committee on Governemnt Productivity, Ontario Government, April, 1972, 19.

[25]On the issue of regionalization, O'Connor points
out that: "the record to date suggests that full scale re-
gional planning (and, ultimately, interregional planning)
will be needed to economize on the transportation budget
(and to that degree alleviate the fiscal crisis), to expand
social investment, and to maintain the growth of pro-
duction and accumulation in the monopoly sector. In turn,
this will require the continued expansion and development
of regional planning agencies, and, ultimately, regional
government." O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis, 110.

[26]The use of participation as a technique in social
control and manipulation is not something new developed
by planners or social scientists. Participatory techniques
have been a part of industrial management theory for decades.
Participation in the work place is used as an attempt to
lower costs, to improve quality, to increase productivity,
to undercut trade union or worker demands, and to give
workers the illusion of power without its actuality.
Just as participation is being used today as a means of
lending legitimacy to the current social order, so has
industrial participation been used over the years to help
legitimize a system of labour which is coersive and alienating.
See: Martin Oppenheimer, "Participative Techniques of Social
Integration," Our Generation, 6(3), (Dec-Jan., 1969).
Also: Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of
Participation (London: Constable, 1968).

[27]Citizen Involvement: A Working Paper, 24-25.

[28]The use of strong police and military powers in a
"democracy" is not without precedent. This has occurred many
times in Canadian history, from as far back as the Rebellion of
1837 to as recently as the 1970 October Crisis in Quebec.
For example, in 1919, a year of massive labour discontent
and rapidly growing socialist movements, the Winnipeg General
Strike threatened to become national in scope. Once normal
means of dealing with the strike failed, the troops were called
in. Labour historian Charles Lipton writes that: "Two were
killed that day, about 30 injured. Winnipeg was declared
under military control, khaki-clad men with rifles were sta-
tioned at the street corners, and about 100 people were arrest-
ed." Within a couple of days most of the strikes were broken
and "order" restored, with few of the union demands being met.
See: Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada: 1827-
1959 (Toronto: NC Press, 1973), 201.

[29]Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, New National
Housing Act Programs: Neighborhood Improvement Program,
Ottawa, 1973.

CHAPTER IV

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

1. The Traditional Planning Process

Since the 1930's planning has been approached as a "process"--a method of rational programming requiring a systematic approach in the making of plans.[1] As one basic planning text points out:

> city planning is viewed as a process--a series of
> evolutionary and rationally organized steps which
> lead to proposals for guided urban growth and de-
> velopment.[2]

These "rationally organized steps" have been fully developed in the planning literature. As described in all basic planning textbooks, the planning process is believed to proceed systematically from the selection of goals and objectives; collection and analysis of pertinent data; generation of alternative policies and plans compatible with the objectives and the data; and finally to plan evaluation, selection and implementation. Each of these steps has its own vast and detailed body of procedural literature.

In addition, the planning process is intended to be comprehensive, in order to cover all possible aspects of a problem. In the end, according to planning theory, the best

possible plans are supposed to result from this rational
"comprehensive planning process."[3] However, the realities of
planning have never quite measured up to planning theory.

2. The Problem of Implementation

The most comprehensive and rational of plans are of little
value if they are incapable of being implemented. In the early
years of the planning profession (and up to the 1950's) the pro-
blem with implementation was with the lack of official acceptance
of planning by local government. Planners, as pointed out in
Chapter II, attempted to seek out public support for planning
as a means to force politicans to initiate and to implement plans.

However, during the 1950's, as the fiscal crisis began to
develop and as the demands for more rational use of public re-
sources arose, planning became firmly established at all levels
of government.

City planning became institutionalized on the assertion
that comprehensive master planning was needed for the orderly
growth and development of cities. The ideology promoted by the
profession that comprehensive solutions are needed, that resources
must be used efficiently, that decision making must be increasingly
rationalized, and that professionally trained planners are uniquely
neutral participants in decision making, helped to legitimize
the existence of early planning agencies. The fiscal crisis and
the resulting need for greater rationalization and planning in
the allocation of increasingly scarce resources, has confirmed

the total acceptance of planning as a legitimate and necessary
governmental activity.

The problem now confronting implementation, therefore,
is not the lack of official support, but public opposition to an
ever increasing number of planning projects. As a recent article
in a professional planning journal points out:

> Locating certain public facilities is increasingly
> subject to citizen opposition. At least in the short
> run, implementation has become costly and subject to
> greater risks. Highway projects, power generating
> plants, public housing, university and hospital ex-
> pansion plans have joined the more traditional lists
> of 'noxious' facilities which generate controversy,
> delay, concessions, vetos, and other implementation
> risks.[4]

This new road block to implementation has caused many planners
to take another look at the "rational comprehensive planning pro-
cess" to see what is wrong. One planner, for example, writing
about the emerging views of planning, points out that a central
question which must be dealt with concerns

> the wide disparity that exists between the planners'
> traditional notions of rationality and the actual
> social (or 'political') process by which policies
> are actually chosen, and . . . what adaptations
> must be made in the method, strategy, or content
> of the planning process. . . [5]

Citizen participation, as a method of determining and incorporating
the attitudes of people towards planning alternatives, with the
hope of better success at implementation, has become a central
one of these "adaptations" to the "method, strategy, or content
of the planning process."

The traditional planning process, claiming (incorrectly)
to be value-neutral and in the service of the overall public in-
terest, ignored the political strength of the potential opponents
to plans. To this degree the planning process is not comprehen-
sive nor is it rational. A key variable to the successful im-
plementation of planning proposals is missing. Official estab-
lished sophisticated citizen participation programs have become
one of the primary means of rectifying this omission. Citizen
participation is becoming, and indeed must become, a necessary part
of the planning process if planning is to be effective.

Planning textbooks and traditional planning theory have
usually made at least some passing reference to the need to in-
form and consult the public. However, until recently, participa-
tion has never been treated seriously, and has never been syste-
matically incorporated into the planning process.

> A Plan that has no meaning for the citizens or
> is in conflict with their views will not receive
> public support. Such a plan cannot be effective
> in influencing development.[6]

As the numbers of the plans and projects whose implementation were
opposed or even stopped continually increased, so did the realiza-
tion of the validity of the above comment and the need to act on
it. Today there is a vast body of literature describing case
histories of citizen participation and the various methods of in-
corporating "constructive" participation into the planning pro-
cess.[7] In addition, planning theory is beginning to reflect this

change by stressing the importance of the social and political aspects of the planning process.

> Traditional comprehensive planning was (and is) neither comprehensive nor planning as I define it. It is not comprehensive because it dealt only with certain spatial aspects of the city (as if a city were mainly a set of land uses), and ignored many of the economic processes of community life, and almost all of the social, cultural, and political processes. It concerned itself with space but not with people and their social groupings; with the location of facilities but not with what went on inside these facilities; and with land values but not with social values.[8]

However, this does not mean that participation is being incorporated into the planning process simply because reformers think that it is a proper and democratic thing to do.

3. Participation as Manipulation

If ours were a pluralist society, incorporating meaningful participation into the societal decision-making process would be a progressive step forward. The reality of participation would match the ideal since our theory of participation would be based on a correct theory of political authority in society. By fully incorporating participation as an integral part of the planning process, planners could then, in reality, plan for "society as a whole," that is, plan in the public interest. There would then be little need for huge numbers of citizens and citizen organizations to continually fight plans, planners, and planning agencies, since their interests would be represented and most likely served.

However, this is not happening, and indeed can not happen, within the confines of our present social order. The pluralist view of society is wrong. The view of planning as a value-neutral process serving the public interest is wrong. And the view held by liberals and reformers that increased participation will help solve our social problems is also wrong. The arguments presented in Chapter III substantiate these conclusions.

Under the present pattern of social relations, a plan always benefits some political interests and discriminates against others. The important question to consider is, as Herbert Gans puts it: "Who plans with what ends and means for which interest group?"[9] Citizens are demanding to participate in decision making, not because participation is an end in itself, but because their interests are not being served and participation is viewed as a means of trying to insure that their interests are served.

However, some planners, government officials, and the corporate interests which are behind many of the more controversial planning proposals, view participation from a totally different perspective. They see public participation as an end in itself. Participation to them is a process which can easily be manipulated for the purpose of co-opting and dividing potential opposition and a process which, by giving planning officials better data on the potential strengths and weaknesses of opposition, allows officials to devise the minimum number of concessions needed to buy off enough of the protesting citizens.

Locating controversial facilities.--There are many examples
of "participation as manipulation" in the citizen participation
literature and a fair amount of research is being conducted along
these lines. One of the better examples is a research project
called "Research of Conflict in Locational Decisions," funded by
the National Science Foundation (an "independent" agency of the
United States government).

The purpose of the research is to find ways of success-
fully implementing controversial proposals for new facilities
by incorporating the minimum number of concessions and side pay-
ments needed to placate the opposition.

> The side payment concept provides the least-cost
> implementation solutions through the provision of
> side-payments in the form of additional minimum
> concessions to placate opposition. This facility
> package method consists of developing solutions
> which combine the original noxious facility to be
> located (main facility), a least-cost package of
> other facilities (auxiliary facilities), and acti-
> vities selected to minimize public costs at given
> risk levels. By considering facility packages at
> various available locations, the solution can in-
> volve not only the least-cost package of facilities,
> but also the optimal site for its implementation.[10]

The only way this least-cost "facility package" method will work
is if planners know the political strengths and weaknesses of the
opposition. They must be able to determine the minimum amount
of concessions and side payments needed to placate any potential
opposition. In addition, they must determine where the opposition
is the strongest and where it is the weakest. For example, if
opposition is weakest along one alternate expressway corridor,
the chances of costly implementation delays will probably be less

if that corridor is selected.

It is only by incorporating a public participation program into the planning process that planners can determine the political strengths and weaknesses of potential opponents. This is accomplished through questionnaires, opinion polls and numerous public meetings in which citizens are allowed to "freely" voice their opinions and objections. In this way, after having analysed this "data," the decision makers can choose the least-cost set of concessions necessary to enable implementation to proceed smoothly.

Also, having learned the strength and opinions of the opposition,

> It may be possible, for example, to 'compensate' local groups for the potentially negative impacts, to eliminate or mitigate some of the negative aspects, to conduct an informational campaign to reduce the perception of negative effects, or to withhold critical information about impacts.[11]

In addition,

> It should be noted that if no set of auxiliary facilities can greatly reduce opposition, then it may be advisable to reevaluate the project and possibly abandon it.[12]

It is in this way, therefore, that citizen participation programs, though somewhat costly and inefficient in the short run, can often be manipulated to serve and complement the long run rationalization and planning process, by helping to guarantee that the enormous costs which went into planning would not be wasted by last minute opposition. Experience has shown that it is not uncommon for many proposals to lead to

disruptions, delays, or to demands for major changes in the design and implementation of the facility--all resulting in additional implementation costs. If the concessions on auxiliary facilities needed to placate the opposition remain within budgetary limitations, then the planning agency could again determine that site which minimized the expected <u>total</u> cost of implementation (which might be different from the least-cost site on physical grounds alone).[13]

An additional expenditure on a participation program can often result in lower implementation costs in the long run. In view of the fiscal crisis, this is becoming increasingly necessary, and governments are increasingly recognizing this. One report published by the Ontario Government, points out that:

> <u>Participation probably is the most efficient and cost-effective manner of making decisions.</u> While conventional wisdom argues that participation slows down decision processes, adds to the overall cost and design of implementation, and introduces a host of irrelevant factors, participation may do precisely the opposite. Most decision-making studies never examine the costs of overcoming consequences not foreseen in advance. There can be no better way of discovering these unforeseen consequences, long a major problem of administration, than by involving in the decision processes those likely to be affected by them. A slower decision can become economical over the long term. Participation, in other words, may be cost-effective through <u>cost-avoidance,</u> something that may be widely accepted in a few years.[14]

It should also be clear by now that participation programs have an enormous potential of being used as methods for manipulation of the public, rather than being used to democratize decision making, as the reformers who advocate it often contend. The papers published by the "Research on Conflict in Locational Decisions" make this point quite clear.

The discussion paper concerning an expressway proposed for New Orleans (a highway which was finally defeated by opposition groups), states:

> Had the Highway Department foreseen the potential opposition, it could have offered its less offensive proposal first and mobilized its own coalition of groups in favor of the expressway.[15]

In another discussion paper, which dealt with the Hudson River Expressway (also defeated by citizen opposition), it is stated that:

> The purpose of this study is to learn more about the development of controversy and the way to minimize or prevent harmful outcomes . . .
>
> One of the presumptions of the research is that by knowing more about the conditions that lead to controversy, the planning agency will be better able to foresee the consequences of its decisions and consider such conditions as criteria in the decision making process.[16]

In another report, titled "Notes of the Development of a Community Opposition Group," the author states:

> The purpose of this report is to help answer the following question: how can one identify in advance community or neighborhood groups who for one reason or another will be effectively able to oppose civic improvement projects?[17]

And finally, a published report which summarizes much of their research, concludes by stating that:

> Greater induced participation on the part of inner city neighborhoods could emerge as a further stage of "co-optation" of community leaders . . . Policymakers can use effectively such techniques to inhibit erosion of their traditional functions. They

can also withold information on critical issues
until it is too late for comminity groups to act
effectively. Their rationale can be, of course,
that their own professional background and expert
judgement provide the greatest assurance of
efficiency, aesthetics and stability in the future
course of city development.[18]

The discussion papers and published articles are all concerned
with buying off the opposition with minimum concessions and side-
payments, and in ways of preventing the organization of community
groups which may oppose various proposals. This is far from a
reform program of making decision making more democratic and re-
sponsive to the needs and interests of citizens. In addition,
this is not merely some academic theoretical writing which is
not being put into practice. Such uses of citizen participation
in urban planning are actually occuring, as the following two
examples indicate.

The Toronto Transportation Plan Review.--Examples of large
scale government initiated public participation programs are be-
coming quite common. The Metropolitan Toronto Transportation
Plan Review (MTTPR) is an example of a planning process designed
to fully incorporate participation as a method of "political data
collection" into the traditional planning process.

Public participation in the context of the
Metropolitan Toronto Plan Review Transportation
Study is seen as a process of mutual education
leading to an interchange of information, ideas
and support among the public, politicians and
planners at all stages of the planning process,
in order that future transportation services may
reflect public opinions and concerns.

> In such a public participation program, in-
> formation is supplied to the planners by the
> public regarding community goals, attitudes,
> values, preferences and priorities; in return
> the planners provide the public with a greater
> knowledge and understanding of their environment
> and familiarize them with the technical planning
> and decision making processes.[19]

The MTPR does not include any partnership, or sharing, or dele-

gation of decision making authority between citizens and officials--

something one would expect if the purpose of the program was in

fact to be "participation" rather than "information gathering."

The MTPR literature points out quite clearly that participation "does

not involve delegation to the public of the politicians' decision-

making responsibilities,"[20] and that, "confusion may arise as to

where the decision-making power lies; it will have to be made

clear that final decisions are made by the elected representatives."[21]

The plan review was established after citizens stopped con-

struction of the Spadina Expressway, a key link in the local trans-

portation master plan. Not only did this disrupt the entire

planned transportation network, but represented an enormous waste

of public funds. A huge interchange and a 6,000 foot ditch com-

plete with bridges are all that remain of the proposed express-

way--an outstanding monument to the implementation problems of

the "traditional-rational-comprehensive-planning-process."

The task of the MTPR was to review the transportation

master plan and the other controversial urban expressways it pro-

posed. In view of the strength and the recent success of citizen

opposition, participation was fully incorporated into the planning

process with an eye to better chances of eventual implementation

of the Plan Review's recommendations.

> [I]t is hoped that by keeping the public informed
> and working closely with them during the study,
> and by inviting their comments on alternative pro-
> posals, the selected plans will meet with greater
> acceptance, and less opposition or apathy.[23]

It appears that the MTTPR to date, in having fully in-
corporated participation into its planning process, has made
successful use of participation as "political data collection."
Solid proof of this is the case of the Scarborough Expressway.
The MTTPR spent a great deal of time studying this highly con-
troversial expressway. The Metro Chairman and other Metro Toron-
to officials were at first demanding that construction begin soon
and they vigorously held that the expressway was absolutely
necessary; whereas the affected citizens, along with many other
citizen organizations throughout the city, openly opposed it.

The MTTPR held a total of 21 public meetings along the
corridor and another 103 meetings throughout the rest of Metro
Toronto, gathering the community's "goals, attitudes, values,
preferences and priorities." In the end, the MTTPR decided not
to recommend construction on the grounds that the expressway was
not needed after all. However, the participation process made
it quite clear to the planners and to the politicians that public
sentiment was so great, and the citizens so well organized, that
any attempt to construct the expressway would cause tremendous
political turmoil and would most likely be doomed to failure.

By the time the MTTPR officially announced its recommen-
dations against the expressway, the entire huge issue simply and

quietly died. The officials, all of a sudden, were no longer militantly in favour of this "absolutely necessary" expressway.

In this case, therefore, the incorporation of participation into the planning process as a means of political data collection, although it was costly (about $400,000) and time-consuming (about two years), saved Metro Toronto officials a great deal of money and prevented a great deal of political and social unrest. Participation, as a means of dealing with the fiscal crisis, successfully functioned by strengthening the rationalization and planning process.

However, this case makes you wonder (if you haven't already) about the "traditional-rational-comprehensive-planning-process." This very process found that the Scarborough Expressway was absolutely necessary and that it must be built as quickly as possible for a lot of "scientific" and technical reasons; yet, only several months later, it found, again for very good "scientific" and technical reasons, that the expressway wasn't needed after all. The major difference, of course, was that the second time around a "political map" was added to the various other technical maps of the traditional planning process, and the officials discovered that:

> A significant majority of those who telephoned or wrote to the Review, spoke at public meetings, filled out questionnaires, sat on the Advisory Committee, or were interviewed as part of a socio-economic study of those who would be displaced, are opposed to the construction of the Scarborough Expressway.[23]

The planners concluded that:

> in light of information available now, and in
> view of changes which would have been difficult
> to foresee in the 1960's, construction of the
> Scarborough Expressway as shown in the currently
> proposed design and in the Metropolitan Toronto
> Transportation Plan is no longer appropriate.[24]

The Boston Transportation Planning Review.--The BTTPR is

not an anomaly. Similar uses of participation are occuring

throughout North America. In Boston, for example, the Boston

Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) was established in January,

1971, to study four highly controversial urban expressways. The

BTPR included an intensive participatory approach.

> There were at least 300 formal community meetings
> held during the 18 month duration of the study, and
> I believe that approximately 35 percent of total staff
> time was devoted to involvement of the staff with
> community groups.[25]

The BTPR planners, in the face of massive community-wide opposition,

have also recognized the need to change the traditional planning

process. As one of the planners points out:

> I would like to suggest that the old transporta-
> tion planning process is dead. The promise of the
> 60's for a systematic transportation-land use
> methodology based on firm quantitative grounds
> leading to rational policy formation has been a
> casuality of the so-called 'highway revolt.' . . .
>
> The challenge has come from the politicization
> of the planning process where the varied and con-
> flicting values of a variety of groups in society
> are clamoring for recognition.[26]

The traditional planning process is dead, not because some

enlightened planners and officials thought it would be a good
idea to have a participatory process, but because they have been
forced into it by the fiscal crisis and the social turmoil
accompanying it. Five or ten years earlier, construction could
have been forced through, in spite of opposition, if the officials
were willing to pay the financial and social costs (delays, design
changes, legal battles, social turmoil, etc.). With the fiscal
crisis and the greater militancy among many citizens, such an
attempt has become much more difficult. A broadened planning
process must take into account these fiscal constraints, and more
and more officials are beginning to do just that. For example,
one BTPR official pointed out that the $3.5 million cost of the
Review and its 18 month duration, were well worth the investment
of this time and money.

> Concerning spending money and wasting time, the
> Inner Belt, which was one of the facilities we
> were studying, has been studied 4 times by the
> traditional process. It has resulted in 20
> years of controversy. There had been nearly $7
> million spent on preliminary egineering for that
> facility before our study. The Southwest Express-
> way has been under controversy for 20 years. . . .
>
> The total amount spent of preliminary engineering
> for that facility prior to our study was approxi-
> mately $12 million. Our aim was not so much
> efficiency as response to what are obviously
> emerging issues in our urban areas. Not to re-
> spond to those issues is inefficient and, as
> Boston proves, terribly expensive.[27]

The BTPR concluded that none of the four expressways under
study should be built and that, instead, more public transit
should be constructed. This recommendation has since been

adopted by the governor. The real results of the BTPR is that
two of the methods of dealing with the fiscal crisis outlined
earlier have been strengthened: 1) rationalization and planning--
the chances of citizens opposing the new transportation plans
developed by the BTPR are slight and, likewise, the chance of
wasting additional millions of dollars on planning efforts are
also slight; and 2) legitimation--Bostonians can now feel that
they really did have a voice in planning, and that the system
really works and isn't so bad after all.

4. Conclusions

Rationalization vs. Legitimation.--As we have seen in
Chapter III and here in Chapter IV, these two methods of dealing
with the fiscal crisis and its social ramifications--legitimation,
and rationalization and planning--appear to have both contradic-
tory and complementary aspects. Participation, when used as a
technique to legitimize government action or inaction, can be a
long drawn out, inefficient process--just the opposite of the re-
quirements of an effective rationalization and planning process.
However, rationalization and planning can often become inefficient
if participation as "political pulse sensing" is not included.
The views of highly organized and vocal citizens must be gathered
and assessed before decisions on the economic and political
feasibility of various alternatives (build, no-build, location,
package of side payments) can be rationally made.

The decision as to which one of the two methods will be emphasized at the expense of the other (i.e., how much "real" participation will be allowed by officials) largely depends upon the importance of the issue. If a minor issue involving a highly localized project is involved, and time is not an important factor, there is likely to be a great deal of citizen participation incorporated in the planning process if the citizens demand it or if the government feels that it is necessary for the legitimation reasons outlined earlier. The planning of local parks, playgrounds, neighbourhood improvement projects, local zoning changes, minor official plan amendments, localized redevelopment proposals, and so on, are all likely to incorporate a great deal of participation. Since time and money are not important, officials don't care if citizens busy themselves with numerous meetings, committees and sub-committees, and endless internal squabbles. Also, because the issue is of minor political and economic significance, officials don't mind giving up some, or even a great deal, of the final decision-making power. Most cases in which participation has been widely publicized as being "successful" have been in these minor issues, in which the ideology that participation really does work and that the government really is responsive is effectively promoted.

In issues of major significance, involving national, regional or even local economic growth and prosperity, participation is used much more restrictively, if at all. Because of the scale and the far-reaching ramifications these issues have (e.g.,

power generating plants, oil pipe lines, expressway systems,
new airports, ports, regional plans, industrial parks, trunk
sewer and water mains, regional economic development policies,
and so on), both time and money are of extreme importance.
Neither can be wasted. Since rationalization and planning are
vital to the successful and efficient completion of these major
types of projects, participation is avoided at all costs.

The only exceptions are in cases where the possibility of
disruption exists. Then a carefully planned, carefully promoted
and carefully guided participatory process is established to help
minimize the chance of disruptions and the amount of social turmoil
caused, while at the same time, to maximize the amount of political
information extracted from the citizens. Both the JTTPR and the
BTPR are examples af this. In both these cases an effective use
of participation helped to determine that the projects in question
were not worth the financial costs and the social turmoil they
would engender if construction was attempted.

However, in cases where the local elites determine that
a project is absolutly necessary, such a participatory process
would help determine where the opposition is the weakest, which
groups could be bought off by what package of side payments, which
alternatives would divide citizens and cause infighting, what type
of public relations campaign should be launched, and so on. The
proposed facility could then be constructed within these con-
straints.

Participation: ideal vs. reality.--Perhaps the key
point these two chapters make is that there is a great deal more
to citizen participation in urban planning than one would gather
from the current planning literature and the current liberal
ideas and official rhetoric about how "nice" it is to include
citizens in the planning process. The liberal ideology of par-
ticipation is far removed from the pragmatic and manipulative
reality of participation. If this fact isn't understood by
citizens and planners involved in "participatory" planning
processes, there is little chance of using participation for the
purpose of bringing about social change, rather than being used
by it to reinforce and stabilize the status quo.

CHAPTER IV

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Planning as a process is distinguished from the "plan" itself. A plan is a set of decisions for action in the future which is arrived at either through a rational planning process, or through some other--either rational or irrational--method of decision making.

[2] F. Stuart Chapin, Jr., Urban Land Use Planning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965), 349.

[3] This is not to say that there haven't been dissenting voices opposing such a process. Charles Lindblom, for example, has always advocated the wisdom of "muddling through" and of disjointed incrementalism, rather than "comprehensive" planning. This, in effect, is not advocating another type of planning process, but rather holds that comprehensive planning is essentially impossible. See: Charles E. Lindblum, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," Public Administration Review, 19(2), (Spring, 1959), 79-88.

[4] A.J. Humphrey, Jr., J.E. Seley and J. Wolpert, "A Decision Model for Locating Controversial Facilities," JAIP, (November, 1971), 397.

[5] R.S. Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning," JAIP, (July, 1967), 233.

[6] T.J. Kent, Jr., The Urban General Plan (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), 80.

[7] For a detailed bibliography of this literature, see: J.D. Hulchanski, Citizen Participation in Planning: A Comprehensive Bibliography, Papers on Planning and Design, Paper No. 2; A.J. Scott, General Editor; Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Toronto, February, 1974.

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[9] Herbert J. Gans, People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 57.

[10]Lumphrey, _et al._, 397.

[11]_Ibid._, 399.

[12]_Ibid._, 400.

[13]_Ibid._, 399.

[14]Frederick C. Thayer, _Participation and Liberal Democratic Government: A Working Paper for the Committee of Covernment Productivity_, Ontario Government, October, 1971, 19-20.

[15]James Hinman, "Controversial Facility-Complex Programs, Sidepayments, and Social Decisions," _Research on Conflict in Locational Decisions_, Paper No. 8, Regional Science Department, University of Pennsylvania, December, 1970, 1.

[16]Shaul Amir, "Conservation Kills a Highway: The Hudson River Expressway Controversy," _Ibid._, Sept. 1970, 1.

[17]Barry Malko, "Notes on the Development of a Community Opposition Group," _Ibid._, Sept., 1970, 1.

[18]Julian Wolpert, _et al._, _Metropolitan Neighborhoods: Participation and Conflict Over Change_ (Washington: Association of American Geographers, Resource Paper No. 16, 1972), 43.

[19]_Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review (MTTPR), Public Participation Program_, May, 1972, 15.

[20]_Ibid._

[21]_Ibid._, 12.

[22]_Ibid._, 17.

[23]MTTPR, _The Scarborough Expressway: A Planning Review_, March, 1974, 82.

[24]_Ibid._, 5.

[25]Ralph Gakenheimer, "Boston Transportation Planning Review Papers: Introduction," _Citizen Participation in Transportation Planning_, (Washington: Highway Research Board, Special Report 142, 1973), 105.   For additional material on the BTPR, see: Stephen C. Lockwood, "The Boston Transportation Planning Review," _Planners Notebook_, 2(4), (August, 1972).   For a description of the politics leading up to the establishment of the BTPR, see: Alan Lupo, _et al._, _Rites of Way: The Politics of Transportation in Boston and the American City_ (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971).

[26] Stephen C. Lockwood, "Participation: Its Influence on Planning Methodology," _Citizen Participation in Transportation Planning_ (Washington: Highway Research Board, Special Report No. 142, 1973), 116.

[27] "Informal Discussion of the Boston Transportation Planning Review," _Ibid._, 133.

CHAPTER V

PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING: ITS FUTURE POTENTIAL

In view of the forgoing, it should be obvious that two
naive and simple views of participation must be rejected. First,
that participation really works and democratizes decision-making
and planning, and that it is the progressive thing to do; and
second, on the other hand, that participation is worthless, a
waste of time and effort, that it is all manipulation, that it
does not produce any outcomes that are meaningful, so let us
not have anything to do with it. These two simplistic views
of participation must be rejected as simply incorrect.

However, having rejected these two extremes, then what
do we do? By doing nothing, we allow the current ways in which
participation is being used and manipulated to continue and
further develop along current patterns as outlined above. Is
this something desirable?

It is for those who are satisfied with the status
quo and who would therefore be interested in conserving the
social structure as it is by trying to work out methods and pro-
grams that are not disruptive and which co-opt dissent and opposi-
tion. Most of the research being conducted into participation
is along these lines. If the current uses of citizen participation

continue and become further developed, the most likely out-
come will probably be a gradual official recognition of citizen
groups, which would mean the formal establishment of "new rules
of the game" to keep citizen activity within predetermined and
politically-manageable limits.

This does not mean that citizen groups should not be
formally recognized as a political force nor that there should
not be "rules of the game" established. Every society needs
these to operate.

What it does mean is that citizen organizations must be
conscious of whose rules are being established and which game is
being played. "Reforms" loftily bestowed by the government and
operated under its bureaucratic control are only devised to
perpetuate activities which are feasible within current institu-
tional structures rather than activities requiring modifications
in institutions, so that political activity on the part of
urban residents can be kept within "acceptable" and manageable
limits (that is, as ineffective as possible in dealing with sub-
stantive matters). The purpose of reforms initiated by the
government and by various professionals (planners, social workers,
social-policy analysts, and so on) is most often to preserve
the system as it is, not to make substantive changes. Such
reform is often seen as an end in itself, rather than a means
to an end. Community groups must, therefore, analyze very care-
fully the full ramifications of liberal and democratic sounding
reforms.

An article by Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, which deals with the problems caused by the "community revolution" of the late 1960's, concludes by promoting the regulation of community organizations.

> If in a multigroup society, within which there to to be effective paricipation, social conflict is to be regulated within bounds, then, just as mechanisms for economic bargaining were worked out in the 1940's and 1950's which brought the trade unions in the society, so mechanisms for political bargaining have to be established which allow for a tradeoff of objectives between groups. This means a more formal recognition of political groups, just as there was recognition of trade unions, and the establishment of rules of the game, within boundaries of defined communities within which the bargaining can take place.[1]

On the surface, such a suggestion sounds progressive and democratic. However, under the current social order, there is no reason to doubt that planners and other social scientists will further develop such mechanisms, not solely for their progressive and democratic content, but to formally co-opt and regulate the activities of community groups.

There has been for a number of years a clear movement in social science research toward developing methods of social control and social management, just as participation has been used for decades as an industrial-management technique to help keep workers pacified and to lessen the chances of walkouts, plant sabotage, and the like. Participation, when managed properly, can be an extremely conservatizing process, not only in the work place but also in the community. To quote Bell and Held again:

One virtue of participation is a simple one. It
not only creates a basis of community, by allowing
people to share in decisions that affect their
lives, it is also a deeply conservatizing institu-
tion for, like property, it gives people a stake
in the decision which becomes binding on all.[2]

This sort of outcome, and this use of participation, does
not have to happen. If citizens involved in participatory pro-
grams and progressively minded planners understand the realities
of participation, and develop strategies based upon this under-
standing, then participation can be used to bring about social
change[3] rather than becoming a social-engineering technique
supporting and legitimizing the current social order.

However, the key question and the most difficult one to
answer, remains: What is the best way of intervening and
changing the likely course of events outlined above? Because
the official use of participation as a social-management tech-
nique is still fairly new and underdeveloped, the particular
forms and tactics of organization and intervention are not yet
very clear.

One thing that is clear is that, despite the actions or
wishes of the state or of citizens, two social phenomena will
continue to occur and to expand:

1) citizens are organizing around urban issues
in increasing numbers, and constantly placing more
and more demands on the state. This activity will
continue to grow as the fiscal crisis worsens, as

the social problems connected with it increase,
and as the conflicts surrounding urban redevelop-
ment intensify; and

2) there are very real fiscal, social and political
constraints which force the state (for legitimation
and rationalization reasons) to encourage or at least
to tolerate "structured" participation programs. But
there are also very real problems which result from
this course of action. There are always some citizens,
for example, who refuse to go along and be "reasonable"
and "constructive," and, as with the case of the War
on Poverty in the U.S., such social management tech-
niques are highly capable of producing unintended
outcomes and quite often, opposite results (that is,
they can backfire quite easily).

Both of these factors guarantee that urban issues and participation
will be major social battlegrounds of the foreseeable future.

Given these conditions, just how should citizens
effectively organize themselves around urban issues and avoid
being co-opted and regulated by government participation pro-
grams? Thus far, urban residents have at best only been capable
of stopping or preventing "bad" things from happening (e.g.,
inner city expressways, urban renewal projects, etc.). Most
often citizen organizations are ineffective in promoting de-
sirable changes but are very effective in frustrating their

members with fruitless meetings, internal squabbles, and ineffective tactics (e.g., letter-writing, petitioning, etc.), so that after an initial burst of activity, most organizations either die or consist of a handful of active people.

There are some community organizations in most cities which have been in existence for decades. For example, the Annex Ratepayers Association in Toronto. The purpose of such groups, which are always located in middle class areas having large numbers of intellectuals and professionals, is to protect their property values and to fight for higher levels of city services and neighbourhood amenities. Their purpose is to preserve and enhance their own interests, not to build an organization seeking basic changes in the social order. Community groups referred to throughout this paper are those groups composed of people who are not satisfied with the status quo and those people who daily suffer the negative consequences of urbanization. Community groups composed of these people have the potential of going well beyond the narrow demands of middle-class groups (who are basically satisfied with their living conditions) because their problems are so much greater and the solutions to their problems lie only in basic changes to the current social order.

Due to this current lack of organizational effectiveness among citizen groups, government-managed participation programs can be quite successful in managing and diffusing citizen demands for basic social change. With huge budgets for participation

programs (with their staffs of sociologists, planners, and
public relations experts, all of whom have expertise in or-
chestrating "constructive" and "responsible" participation),
the state can organize people on its own terms and for its
purposes.

However, just as the state has learned from its past mis-
takes, so must citizen organizations learn from theirs. Just as
the state is developing techniques of using participation for
their own purposes, citizens must learn to take full advantage
of the potential participation offers. As pointed out above,
participation programs can easily produce far-reaching unintended
outcomes if citizens understand the political dynamics involved
in participation (and are not fooled by the liberal rhetoric)
and if they use this understanding to design strategies capable
of seizing the opportunity for using the participation process
for their own ends, rather than being used by it.

In order to do this, there are a number of organizational
and tactical lessons which can be drawn from current experience
with community organizations and participation programs. The
following are six important organizational principles a citizens'
group must implement if it hopes to be at all effective.

1) A citizens' organization cannot be based solely on
a neighbourhood level, but at the minimum, on a city wide level.
This follows directly from the analysis in Chapter III (pages
63-64) outlining the detrimental effects of "divide and conquer"
strategies in which one group ends up fighting another. A

neighbourhood which only looks after its own interest and does
not consider the ramifications of its action on the rest of the
larger community, can often advocate solutions to their problems
which directly harm adjoining (or even nonadjoining) neigh-
bourhoods. Rather than solving the problem, and rather than
building wider support for their position, they end up fighting
with other neighbourhood groups. This does not mean that groups
at the neighbourhood level should not exist. It means that
they should not exist in isolation and must always be part of
a larger organization with a city or metro wide focus, so that
all small demands in a neighbourhood can be seen in the context
of the whole area.

2) The issues an organization deals with must be city
wide in scope, and the choice of issues must itself be a matter
of careful decision. Most citizen organizations take up what-
ever issues come along (e.g., defending neighbourhood amenities,
or fighting "bad" redevelopment projects) and remain "issue"
orientated in the narrow sense of the term. When the issue in
contention is resolved or the groups' efforts defeated, the
organization quickly disintergrates. To avoid this, criteria
for selecting issues must be developed and the issues must be
chosen only after careful deliberation. In order to build
broader support and to help insure organizational stability,
all small scale, local issues must have a city wide focus and
must be part of the organizations' broader, long term

objectives. In other words, issues must not lead to dead ends
and must not be harmful to other neighbourhoods in the city.

3) An organization must develop a program based upon
a comprehensive analysis of urban issues. Presently, most groups
have ill-defined purposes and goals, and never know what to do
next or what issues to choose or what tactics to use. Therefore,
most groups can only act defensively (opposing policies and pro-
grams) and not offensively (promoting positive change). Likewise,
these groups are very susceptible to being managed and manip-
ulated by government officials and middle class social workers
and other such professionals. A program outlining workable
tactics based upon a comprehensive and continually verified
analysis of current conditions is the only way of guiding a
groups' decisions as to the issues, tactics and timing of their
activities. In this way present activities can be linked up
with past and future activities in a broader and more rational
program, rather than simply doing something this year, another
different thing next year, and so on. With a program to guide
them, citizens can initiate activities to promote change and
to promote desirable policies, rather than just being capable
of sometimes preventing "bad" things from happening to them.
Developing a program and an analysis of urban issues is not
easy. However, a group must develop a specific program no matter
how inadequate it may at first be. The program, and the analysis
on which it is based, develops as the group develops.

4) <u>An organization cannot be open to just anyone.</u>

A group cannot develop a coherent program if it is made up of
people with diverging and often opposite interests. People
basically satisfied with the <u>status quo</u> and people satisfied
with their living conditions are not good material for an or-
ganization interested in bringing about change. Many present
community groups are made up of people from the upper and
middle classes, the working class, as well as the poor. Most
participation programs and citizen task forces spend most of their
time with internal fighting because they are made up of industrial
interests, real estate interests, business interests, residential
interests, working class interests, and so on. How can such a
group ever become a viable and effective force for change? It
can't. And that is why government participation programs always
try to incorporate all the various interests in the process.
Such groups can never agree on a strong program and strong tac-
tics for change--most of the time they can not even agree on
the need for change and the definition of the problem. These
diverse groups, therefore, always engage in compromised, and often
ineffective, activities--when they do engage in any activities
at all. The only thing these groups end up agreeing on is to
preserve the <u>status quo</u>. "No change is the best state of affairs"
turns out to be the only possible "consensus." Such groups,
by their very composition, cannot work <u>for</u> change.

5) <u>Citizen organizations should not automatically
direct their struggles at government but must determine in
each specific case whether or not the government is the cause
of the problem.</u> Currently, citizens direct all their demands
at levels and agencies of government, only to find in some cases
officials claiming to be "sympathetic" but unable to act because
they lack sufficient authority or have "no choice" in the matter
because of other constraints. The organization then either ends
up doing nothing or engaging in fruitless and frustrating actions
aimed at powerless officials and agencies. Hence, it follows
that the organization must be able to decide, in each concrete
case, if: a) the administrative or political decision it opposes
or seeks to obtain are <u>within</u> or <u>outside of</u> the sphere of authority
of that level of government; or b) if the level of government
in question is merely a passive actor pressured by other more
powerful interests or dynamics in society into acting the way
it does. If "a" is the case, then direct pressure on government
is the correct action to take. If "b", then it would be foolish
and futile to act as if the government was the villain. Instead
the organization must <u>identify</u> the particular interests or dynamics
in society which have forced the government to do what it did
(or to do what it is likely to do). This is where a comprehen-
sive analysis of urban issues and an understanding of the realities
of the current situation are vitally important. The organization
can then devise tactics to confront and attempt to change these
dynamics by launching its political actions against the <u>source</u>
of the problem.

6) <u>To be effective, the struggles of citizen organizations
in the community must link up with those of labour in the work
place.</u> The ultimate cause of the problems both groups are
struggling against are the same. The only difference is that
workers face the industrial and commercial capitalists in the
work place, while citizen groups confront them in the community.
Because of the changing nature of modern capitalism and the ever-
increasing intervention of government into all phases of social
activity, the struggle has shifted from the sphere of production
(of commodities and services) where the primary struggle was in
the work place, to the sphere of reproduction (i.e., the
maintenance of a stable, if not improving, standard of living)
where the primary struggle lies in all phases of daily life--
at work in the factory or office <u>and</u> at home in the community.
Unless both these struggles are united and both groups see that
their interests and their problems <u>are</u> the same, their potential
strength will not be realized. Furthermore, both groups will
continue to often struggle against each other--unions seeing
anti-development citizen activities as costing them jobs, for
example. This is another reason why neighbourhoods cannot be the
basis of organization. Only at a city-wide level, can you find
enough people who are simultaneously hurt as workers and hurt
as urban residents. These people, and only these, can form the
<u>core</u> of such an organization. This does not mean that such an
organization, given its core constituency, should not, under
specific conditions, seek as many allies as possible from among
other groups.

These are only some of the more obvious organizational principles which must be incorporated into citizen activity if it hopes to become an effective force in dealing with urban problems, and if it hopes to avoid being "managed" into ineffectiveness by the "establishment of rules of the game," as Bell and Held, among many others, would like to see happen.

Admittedly, much more in the way of organizational principles has to be learned before urban residents can become an effective force promoting positive change, rather than just negatively opposing proposed actions of government and business. That urban residents and community organizing methodology can overcome their current organizational problems and general lack of effectiveness is not as unlikely as it may seem at the present time.

If, for example, we look back 100 to 150 years, we could never have imagined that workers in factories could ever overcome their organizational problems and the unrestrained use of police power against them in their attempt to effectively unionize. Likewise, even 15 years ago, union militancy and strikes among public sector employees (teachers, transit workers, civil servants, hospital workers, post office employees) would have seemed equally improbable given the nature of their work and all the laws and regulations restricting and even prohibiting public sector unions and their right to strike. But as the seriousness of the problems facing these groups increased and as they learned from their past mistakes in attempting to organize, they eventually were able to make significant gains.

So too with citizen organizations. As the seriousness of
the fiscal crisis and its social and political ramifications in-
crease, and as more sophisticated management techniques such as
the misuse of democratic participation become all the more common,
so too will the intensity of political activity on the part of
urban residents increase, as well as their ability to organize
effectively against the abuse of democratic participation, caus-
ing such social-management techniques to backfire in the long
run. This is not just wishful thinking. It has happened, and is
currently happening, in many cities across Canada and the United
States. And it will continue to happen for the reasons out-
lined earlier (pages 97-98).

The only question is whether or not the full potential
participation offers as a vehicle for social change can be suc-
cessfully utilized by urban residents, or whether it will be used
by government (as outlined in Chapters III and IV) to help pre-
serve the status quo and to obstruct movements for change in
urban communities. The first step in utilizing this potential
is to fully analyze and understand just what the potentials and
constraints of participation really are, as opposed to the sur-
face manifestations and the idealized rhetoric connected with
it. This paper has been an attempt to develop such an analysis.
But understanding the potential participation in urban planning
offers is not enough. Unless people act on this potential, it
will never be actualized.

CHAPTER V

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1]Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, "The Community Revolution," The Public Interest, Summer, 1969, 177.

[2]Ibid.

[3]The notion of social change is admittedly and intentionally left vague in this paper, the reason being that a full treatment of this is well beyond the scope of this paper.

However, it is possible to outline the general direction of progressive social change. History shows, for example, that there are major directions in which society moves, which not only in retrospect can be found to be the case, but also can be seen to be the case as they are happening.

An example of this is the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The emerging capitalists at that time were the progressive class who consciously sought (and eventually did) bring about significant social change in the basic institutions of society, by putting an end to the feudal order. They did not accomplish this by accident, but understood at the time the real direction of the changes occuring and developed strategies of furthering and promoting this change.

Today, we can see that the main contradiction is between the socialization of the costs of production and the private appropriation of the benefits, causing the fiscal crisis and resulting in the inability of government to deal with the problems of urban poverty, poor housing, insufficient social services, and so on. The movement of social change, therefore, is and must be in the direction of greater socialization of ownership and appropriation. This is the only way the fiscal crisis can be solved and is the only way government can get sufficient resources so that all the "urban problems" can even begin to be solved.

Thus, for the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to state that by "progressive social change" is meant those activities which have the potential of bringing about greater socialization of ownership and greater social appropriation of the surplus produced by private enterprise.

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